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This paper examines the means to incorporate the use of market signals through prices into
water resources management with the objective of improving efficiency in the allocation of
water. It reviews a vast body of recent literature on tradable resource use rights as well as
actual experiences with implementing tradable water rights programmes both in Latin America
and in the rest of the world. The issues discussed include the conditions required for a
well-functioning water market; the potential strengths and weaknesses claimed for markets as
a means of water allocation; the characteristics of the operation of a water market; types of
transactions; the initial allocation of water rights; design issues, including permanent and
time-limited water rights, and hydrological security and allocation rules; the limitations of
markets and the factors that can adversely affect their performance, including externalities
(return flow, instream and area-of-origin effects), market power, transaction and transportation
costs, and steps to mitigate them; and opportunities for expanding the role and scope of water
markets.
7Introduction
After many years of discussions at international forums and among international agencies
active in water management, finally in the Dublin Statement, adopted at the International
Conference on Water and the Environment in January 1992, the rhetoric of international
meetings on water resources management recognized that water is essentially an economic
good. The fourth Principle of the Dublin Statement asserts that: "Water has an economic value
in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good". This is not a very
new proposal. Economists interested in water resources management have long argued the
necessity to recognize that water is an economic good and not to treat water as having "unique
importance" but as one good among all others.
"This is not to deny that, as a commodity, water has its special features; for
example, its supply is provided by nature partly as a store and partly as a flow,
and it is available without cost in some locations but rather expensive to
transport to others. Whatever reason we cite, however, the alleged unique
importance
 of water disappears upon analysis" (Hirshleifer, De Haven and
Milliman, 1960).
If water is an economic good then it should be possible to govern its allocation through
the market. For many years, it has been widely recognized in the literature that in the absence
of markets it is difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate the real demand for water-related services
because demand-functions cannot be estimated in such a situation (Fox and Herfindahl,
1964). In the place of markets and the signals for efficiency in investment decision-making
which they provide numerous, elaborate and unsatisfactory substitutes have been suggested.
All these substitutes have in common that they provide only poor, if not incorrect signals, that
they are essentially arbitrary and that they provide no real solution to the problem of achieving
an efficient allocation of water. The only solution is to place as great a reliance as possible on
prices and, therefore, on markets in the process of allocation of water and the related
investments in productive services. If efficiency is the goal then the role of administrative
allocation must be restricted to those few areas where markets cannot be developed and to the
regulation of natural monopolies.
"In light of the information problem, there seems to be little hope that
administrative approaches can allocate water even with only minimal
efficiency among the processes that result in marketable goods. It is not
reasonable to expect a staff and a ... board to know what water is worth in
every water use, which is necessary in order to know the economic efficiency
of each board decision. The solution to the information problem will likely
necessitate applying a market-like process for allocating water to produce
market goods. The regulatory approach and the limited funds ... can then be
focused on the areas where they are needed, which is in deciding water
needs for the nonmarket goods" (Lynne, 1988).
It must be carefully considered, however, when advocating the introduction, extension
or maintenance of public intervention in water allocation how effective it can be. Administrative
approaches to water allocation are often criticized for their implicit reliance on "the ability of the
few decision makers within a centralized structure to act objectively, omnisciently, and
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the debates more than 30 years ago on this issue in the United States of America,
"... that while public intervention was necessary, it need not be sufficient for
improvement in efficiency. For intervention to be also a sufficient condition for
improvement in efficiency, appropriate criteria must be developed and,
assuming in the final analysis that there is a feasible way to do so, applied with
sufficient fidelity to ensure that the objectives of public intervention in the
interests of efficiency are reasonably approximated" (Krutilla, 1966).
In discussing public policy towards water management and the issue of using prices
and introducing markets as a major tool for water allocation and, therefore, for water
management, it has to be understood that "controlling the use of water courses is a basic
economic problem of resource allocation" (Freeman and Haveman, 1971). A fact equally true
for the quality and quantity aspects of allocation.
"It is interesting to reflect that the large and lengthy debate on public policy for
water management in the 1960s in the United States led to little innovation in
water management practice. Water management and water allocation
decisions remained largely in the hands of national or state bureaucratic
agencies. The use of both prices and markets and river basin institutions has
been of only marginal significance until comparatively recently with the
increasing use of markets in water allocation in the western states of the
Union" (Freeman and Haveman, 1971).
To come closer to the present and to the water management issues current in Latin
America and the Caribbean, the increasing private participation in water management has
brought with it as a corollary the wider opening of water management to market forces and
increased the application of economic principles to water allocation decisions, at least in some
areas. It has also increased the interest in directly employing prices and markets as the main
tools for water allocation. One sign of this interest is the amount of literature discussing the
experience of the few places where water markets exist, particularly the amount of interest
shown in the Chilean experience.
The adoption of a market approach to water allocation in Chile has attracted much
interest from all over the world, although serious economic analysis remains largely absent
from the discussion of the Chilean experience. The findings of the one economic analysis that
has been made suggests the importance of remedying this lack of serious economic
evaluation (Hearne and Easter, 1995), but there is certainly much more literature on the current
Chilean system than on any previous water allocation system adopted in any other Latin
American country.
There are several reasons why the interest in water markets, as a means of water
allocation, is increasing in many Latin American and Caribbean countries, as well as in the
world as a whole. The water economy of many countries is entering a mature phase
characterized by inelastic supply of new water and increased interdependencies among water
uses and users (see Table 1). As the water economy matures, the attention of participants in
the policy process is gradually shifting from concern with the expansion and subsidy of the
development of the water sector to revenue generation, demand management, and
reallocation. The driving force behind the interest in the use of prices and markets is the
9perception that there are substantial gains from trade to be realized from the introduction of
water marketing, gains which represent the opportunity cost of failing to modify existing water
institutions in ways which will promote more economically efficient use of available water
supplies. Moreover, there is an additional perception that other allocative mechanisms will not
achieve the desired increases in efficiency in water use.
Table 1
Characteristics of mature water resource systems
Item Mature phase Item Mature phase
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Source: adapted from Randall (1981).
Historically, new users could obtain water through appropriating water rights to which
no previous claims had been established. At present, in the countries of Latin America and the
Caribbean, although overall supply is plentiful, in many areas with concentrated economic
development, all surface water and much of groundwater is appropriated. Alternatively,
historically, new water supplies have been obtained through the construction of storage and
conveyance facilities, projects usually undertaken with the help of substantial public subsidies.
It is now widely recognized that this policy has led to investments in projects, whose real
economic viability is in doubt, to the wasteful use of water and to negative effects on the
environment.
Moreover, in many areas, as the best and the least expensive water sources have
been developed and attention increasingly turns to the more expensive and locationally
disadvantageous sources, the costs of new project has begun to escalate. Successive
increases in reservoir storage capacity produce diminishing returns in the safe yield.
Consequently, as the options for increasing water supplies through the manipulation of surface
flows diminish and the subsequent increases in storage require larger and larger investments,
the costs of new projects begin to rise dramatically (Frederick, 1993). This is occurring as
public subsidies have been significantly curtailed and even disappeared in many countries as a
result of limited public budgets, changing social priorities, lack of political support for traditional
methods of financing water development, and growing concerns about the environmental costs
of new projects.
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On the other hand, due to population growth, urbanization and economic development,
per capita water availability is decreasing. Concurrent with growing demand from agricultural,
drinking water supply and sanitation, industrial, and environmental uses, there have been
significant structural changes in national economies. At the same time that demands for both
instream and withdrawal uses of water expand with economic and population levels, water
pollution diminishes the available quantities of good quality water and increases the costs of
treatment. It can be expected that there will be increasing demands to reallocate supplies
among uses.
Once markets are introduced and property rights established in water, it can be
expected that transfers of water rights will occur whenever the net benefits from a reallocation
are positive, until marginal values, net of transaction and conveyance costs, are equalized
among water users, uses and locations. Trade will continue until all water users are indifferent
between buying and selling water rights. Since market transactions are precipitated by the
difference in the value of water in alternative uses and locations which must be large enough to
outweigh the transaction and transportation costs of obtaining water through the market, water
markets are unlikely to emerge, be active or operate effectively where water is in surplus and
or where there are alternative sources of low-cost water. It is for this reason that market activity
often intensifies in periods of insufficient water supplies remaining less active or latent in
periods of normal supply conditions. In Chile, for example, water markets are more active in
those basins in the north of the country where water is more scarce (Donoso, 1994). Also in
Texas, although transfers of surface water rights have been theoretically possible for several
decades, they did not begin until the first river basin was fully adjudicated over 20 years ago
with the major activity concentrated in the Lower Rio Grande Valley where there is virtually no
groundwater (Chang and Griffin, 1992).
The evidence suggests, as the discussion in this paper amply demonstrates, that
water markets work, but that to make them work well requires a clear understanding of the
institutional and legal framework, the establishment of clear rules and regulations governing
exclusive property rights, the necessity for simple transfer mechanisms and, the corollary, of a
minimum of bureaucratic interference in the market. It is these necessary components of a
water market which are discussed in this paper. In addition abundant examples are provided of
the working of water markets in practice and of innovations that have been made in their
working as experience has been gained.
At the same time, it is recognized that the introduction of water markets is by no
means a universal solution to the problems facing water resources management. A water
market is a management tool. It is a tool, however, which spreads the burden and difficulties of
management among a larger population, permits greater participation in management
decisions and can introduce greater flexibility into management systems. At the same time,
however, the establishment of a water market demands new skills and new attitudes from the
public administration, judicial systems and water users, as well as, investment in registration of
rights, monitoring and measurement systems, and possibly in improving water distribution and
transportation systems. On the whole, "... the prerequisites needed for a viable water market
are the same as those needed for good water management" (Simpson, 1994b).
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I. Water markets and water allocation
In a water market, water is allocated at a price set by the free exchange of some type of
property right to the use of water either for a limited period of time (a lease) or in perpetuity (a
sale). It is the interactions between the buyers and sellers of rights which comprise a water
market. The water market is the institution, formal or informal, which facilitates the exchange of
water rights among buyers and sellers (Cummings and Nercissiantz, 1992). Water markets are
distinguished from other allocation processes by the following characteristics (Colby, 1988):
 • The transfer of water is the real purpose of the transaction and the value of water is
distinct from the value of other goods and services involved in the transaction. A
water market exists where water rights are commodities with an identity distinct from
other real property. There are many examples of what have been called "implicit"
water markets, where water is sold as a part of a land transfer, although the purpose
of the transaction is to obtain water (Colby, Crandall and Bush, 1993). Such
transactions cannot be considered as "water markets", but more as examples of a
means of evading inefficient bureaucratic or legislative restrictions.
 • The motivating force is the mutual perception by potential buyers and sellers that the
transaction is in their own best interest given the alternative opportunities available to
them; consequently, reallocation is wholly voluntary.
 • No central authority determines, although it may condition or regulate, price and
other terms of transfer; they are generated in voluntary transactions negotiated
between willing buyers and sellers.
For a market to ensure flexibility in the allocation of existing water supplies, it is
necessary only that within any individual market there is a tradeable margin subject to low-cost
reallocation, if only a small part of total supply (Howe, Schurmeier and Shaw, 1986b). Since the
volumes of water that can be expected to be reallocated are generally not large, water markets
can be expected to normally be relatively small or "thin". The number of transactions does not
say much about the ability of a market to efficiently reallocate water resources in response to
changes in the value of marginal productivity of water. The number of transactions is a function
of many factors, including the initial allocation of property rights.
A. Required conditions for trade
Efficient construction of any market requires the existence of the necessary conditions for
trading to occur: (i) well-defined property rights; (ii) public information on the supply of and the
demand for water rights; and, (iii) the physical and legal possibility for trading to take place
(Curie, 1985). Of these three necessary conditions by far the most important is the existence of
well-defined property rights. In the case of water, property rights define and limit the rights and
duties of their holders relative to one another and to the rest of society to the use of a certain
amount of water, which may be defined either volumetrically or in terms of shares of a stream
or canal flow. If rights are poorly defined, market processes cannot be relied upon to allocate
water resources efficiently. It is a basic responsibility of governments, as far as markets are
concerned, to define, allocate and enforce property rights in water. Government policies play a
critical role in defining the institutional setting for market operation and provide the basis for
market activity by defining, allocating and enforcing water rights.
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The fugitive and elusive nature of water can present problems in the establishment,
definition and enforcement of property rights, which are the essential foundation of any market
allocation mechanism, but they are not such as to "rule out either the possibility or the
desirability of using prices and regulated markets to introduce economic incentives to restrain
use, encourage conservation, and facilitate reallocation of supplies" (Frederick and Kneese,
1988). In fact, it seems to be possible that "through careful design of both property rights and
market limitations, much can be achieved by relying upon market incentives" (Griffin and
Boadu, 1992).
1. Property rights
The way property rights are defined will structure the incentives and disincentives which
members of society face in their decisions regarding water ownership, use and transfer. In
order for market participants to estimate the value of a water right, they must be able to form
secure expectations about the benefits and costs associated with owning and transferring it
and the degree to which it is protected from impairment by others (Colby, 1988). Only on that
basis can they make economically rational decisions about water use and transfer. If property
rights are not well-defined, the consequent uncertainty will reduce the expected value of the
rights and the incentive to engage in trading (Shabman and Cox, 1986). To produce efficient
resource allocation through the market the definition of property rights should satisfy the
conditions of specificity, exclusivity, transferability, comprehensiveness, and enforceability
(Tietenberg, 1988; Saliba and Bush, 1987):
 • The rights and duties of water rights holders relative to one another and to the rest of
society should be specified and enforced so that they can form secure expectations
regarding the benefits stemming from their rights. Conditions that affect the water
rights, their transfers, and the duties of their owners should be clearly defined,
preferably as a part of the right or in the body of law which specifies the rights of the
owners. The right must be defined in readily understood terms and be easily
measured in the field using practical methods (Simpson, 1994b).
 • If water markets are to result in efficient water allocation and to produce appropriate
price signals, the buyers and sellers, and not third parties, must enjoy all the benefits
and bear all the costs associated with owning, using and transferring the water rights.
 • Water rights must be easily transferable at low cost through either sale or lease and
not be tied to particular sectors, uses, priorities or to other property.
 • Water rights must be described in all their necessary attributes (e.g., the quantity
diverted, the timing, and places of diversion, use and return) that generate value and
can affect other water users. Evidence from water markets in the western United
States suggests that market prices are strongly influenced by specific water right and
transaction characteristics (Colby, Crandall and Bush, 1993). On the other hand,
since markets operate more efficiently when the commodity being traded is
homogeneous, the definition of the right should not be excessively detailed. The
more detailed the definition of the property right in water, the greater will be the
heterogeneity among them and the transaction costs for potential buyers and sellers,
and hence the more difficult it will be to organize a market (Howe, Schurmeier and
Shaw, 1986b).
 • Water rights holders must be able to capture the benefits associated with water use
and transfer decisions. "Since rights cannot be perfectly enforced, ownership will
always be probabilistic; but when the probability of capturing benefits from a use is
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low, it is less likely that the owner will devote the resource to that use" (Anderson,
Terry, 1982). Water rights must be secure from involuntary seizure or encroachment
by others, including the State. Enforcement, via a court system or by mutual control,
is needed to ensure the validity of water rights. The water right must be registered
and recorded to minimize the possibility of dispute over ownership. In order to
enforce user rights it must be possible to monitor water use by individual users,
detect violations and the legal ability and authority must exist to deal with the
violations. Sanctions should represent a credible threat and induce compliance.
2. Information
The publically available information on the supply of and the demand for water rights must
include the means to identify willing buyers, sellers and intermediaries or brokers, and the
means for entering into enforceable contracts. Hydrological information is also required to
permit the right to be defined. Various types of information are essential for rational decision
making by water rights holders, e.g., on legal and hydrologic characteristics of water rights, the
cost of alternative means of obtaining water. This implies the existence of a good data and
monitoring systems.
3. The possibility of trade
A clearly defined set of transfer rules are necessary to permit market transactions to take place
when buyers and sellers determine. Transactions should be contingent only upon compliance
with a known set of trading rules or transfer criteria. This is a prerequisite for a continuous
water market. When the transfer rules are not known with certainty before a transaction is
contemplated by the economic agents and potential market participants cannot predict during
their negotiations whether or not the proposed transaction will be approved, there is no
incentive for continuous market-like decision making (Curie, 1985). There must, also, be the
physical possibilities for the transfers produced through trade to actually happen, conveyance
systems, monitoring systems, etc. The seller must be able to physically move the water to a
suitable point or the buyer must be able to take delivery and convey it to the point of intended
use (Price, 1994). This may require easements or the purchase of rights of way across the
property of others.
4. Market activity
Market transactions occur when both potential buyers and sellers perceive that there are
economic gains to be captured by transferring water to a purpose, place or time of use in which
it generates higher net returns than under existing use patterns. Transfers occur automatically
whenever the net benefits from a reallocation are positive until marginal values are equalized
among water users, uses and locations. Trade will continue until all water users are indifferent
between buying and selling water rights. Three conditions must be satisfied if a market
transaction is to take place: (i) the seller must receive a price offer that at least equals both the
returns foregone as a result of the water rights given up and the transaction and transportation
costs born by him or her; (ii) the buyer must expect the returns from the purchase to exceed
both the price paid to the seller and the transaction and transportation costs born by him or her;
and (iii) for the buyer, the total costs associated with the market acquisition of water rights must
be less than the costs of the least expensive alternative water supply source (Colby, 1988).
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Since market transactions are precipitated by the difference in the value of water in
alternative uses and locations which must be large enough to outweigh the costs of obtaining
water through the market process, water markets will become active only where and when
water is sufficiently scare, and hence valuable. Conversely, water markets are unlikely to
become active where many water rights remain unappropriated, where water supply
investments continue to be favoured over reallocation, where transportation and transaction
costs are very high, or where there are other sources of low-cost water.
B. Types of transactions
One of the principal benefits of water markets are the almost unlimited possibilities for water
reallocation with the only real restraint the ingenuity of the trading parties (Driver, 1986). Water
rights transfers can take a variety of forms, each serving a different operational purpose in a
water resource system (Israel and Lund, 1995). The choice of the form of water transfer
depends on the structure of the market, the legal and third party considerations that the
transaction must accommodate, the definition and characteristics of the water right, the
transaction costs, the characteristics of supply and demand, other local conditions, and, above
all, the needs of the parties to the transaction.
1. Sales
The permanent transfer of title, including all benefits, costs, risks, and obligations associated
with the right is usually a response to long-term changes in demand and supply conditions
which increase the marginal value of water in some uses and decrease it in others. Sales are
"the preferred market structure when the goal is to satisfy permanent demand shifts" (Howitt,
1997). The permanent transfer of water rights through sales can be expected to be less
frequent than lease contracts.
Sales are common in intersectoral transfers, with irrigated agriculture being the
dominant water seller and urban users the principal buyers. In the western United States, for
example, while intra-agricultural transfers occur in many areas, water transfers out of
agriculture to municipal and industrial uses is the predominant form of market transactions
(Saliba and Bush, 1987). In Chile, intra-agricultural water sales, as well as intersectoral sales,
are common in many areas (Hearne and Easter, 1995; Gazmuri and Rosegrant, 1994).
2. Lease contracts
The leasing of water rights involves the sale of water, but not of the water right.
Under a lease, the title to the water right remains with the lessor and at the end of the
contract, the right must be returned. Leases are a preferred market response to
short-term changes in demand and supply conditions. These operations are
commonly referred to as constituting a spot market for water.
Water users may find it advantageous to engage in lease contracts for a
variety of reasons. The lessor has an opportunity to earn revenue in the temporary
trade of surplus water rights while not giving up water rights. Leases are particularly
useful when users need to accommodate: a short-term demand for additional water;
a long-term but variable demand; any use that has a predictable and fixed life span; a
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use of uncertain duration, e.g., a farmer facing variable commodity prices; highly
variable supplies, e.g., where it is not economical to transport water in periods of
sufficient water supply; water users' unwillingness or inability to commit the resources
necessary to buy the water right or the desire to limit their ownership of water rights;
and unexpected events (Shupe, Weatherford and Checchio, 1989; Saliba and Bush,
1987).
Under a typical lease contract, the lessee pays the owner of the water right
(the lessor), generally in periodic instalments, but there can also be an up-front
payment to initiate the lease. Lease contracts are often renewable. The length of a
lease, in irrigation districts, is typically a single season, but it can be longer, even
several decades. Leases can be, on the other hand, very short, sometimes for only a
few hours. In the short-run, leases are usually a cheaper source of water than
permanent transfers, but water can and will fluctuate in price, water supplies are only
secure until the contract expires, there is also an expense in the constant renewal
costs for those who depend on short-term leases, and there is a risk of default, for
the lessee has only a contract as protection, not a property right (Scott and Coustalin,
1995).
Leasing arrangements can accommodate the most varying needs. The
flexibility of leases makes them an attractive option for many users, and rental or
lease markets are often very active, particularly among neighbouring water rights
holders in irrigation districts. Leases, often of informal nature, are usually the
predominant form of market transactions. In informal markets, most transactions are
in the form of short-term leases, because difficulties with contract enforcement
impede the permanent transfers of water rights.
In Chile, for example, leasing has been a much more active form of water
reallocation than water rights sales (Trabajo de Asesoría Económica al Congreso
Nacional, 1996). Perhaps the most common transaction is rental or leasing between
neighbouring farmers whose water requirements differ through the cropping cycle
(Gazmuri, 1994; Gazmuri and Rosegrant, 1994). In California, as well, water
marketing is characterized by an emphasis on seasonal spot markets (Howitt, 1997).
A particular form of lease is the leasing-back of purchased rights, usually to
the original owners and often for a nominal payment, when rights are bought in
anticipation of future needs. A lease-back permits the new owner to receive benefits
from the water during the holding period. Moreover, in those jurisdictions where a
water right can be lost after a period of non-use, it ensures the continued beneficial
use of water rights and acts as a protection from forfeiture. Under a conditional




Option contracts, also known as contingent or interruptible water markets, are a long-term
agreement to lease, less commonly to sell, a water right when a given contingency occurs,
typically a drought (dry year option contracts). Many of the benefits of option contracts might be
secured from short-term leases without long-term commitment, but leasing could increase
participants' income risk and result in higher transaction costs, including investment in delivery
systems and measurement costs of assuring compliance (Hamilton, Whittlesey and Halverson,
1989). There are examples of their use in both the United States and in Chile. A typical
arrangement, in Chile, is the payment by a fruit farmer of a pre-negotiated fee to a farmer
growing annual crops for an option on water supply in the case of drought (Thobani, 1997).
Option contracts are commonly used to transfer water from irrigated agriculture to
non-agricultural users during periods of low stream flow. Dry year option contracts are an
attractive alternative when water users have adequate water supplies in normal years. Such
contracts can provide supplies during droughts at a lower cost than purchases or leases. A
study of the use of option contracts for temporary use of irrigation water for providing drought
insurance for urban water agencies for a case study area in northeast Colorado found that this
approach is economically viable under a wide range of conditions (Michelsen and Young,
1993).
Option contracts are particularly attractive because the lessor maintains secure
long-term water supplies, receives compensation for the option, including that for the income
lost when the option is exercised and for the additional complexity introduced in planning
business activities, and retains access to water during normal supply conditions when the
option is not exercised. For the lessee, the contract provides a means of obtaining additional
water supply, under predetermined conditions, whenever a given contingency occurs and at a
specified price.
Option contracts are complex. In part, this is due to the need to address the risk to the
lessee that the water right will not be available when the time comes to exercise the option. In
part, this is due to the concern of the lessor that the contract limits his or her property rights
and may limit the ability to benefit from future transactions, e.g., an opportunity to sell, although
this issue can be addressed by including in the contract the "right of first refusal" which allows
the seller to retain the option of selling the water rights before contract termination, but gives
the option holder the right to match the offered price (Michelsen and Young, 1993). In addition,
to produce the greatest benefits, option contracts require long-term contractual commitments,
often up to twenty or more years, a contract length which can present many uncertainties.
Compensation is often adjustable over time to allow for changes in water use,
production costs, technology and other market conditions. Various methods of payments can
be used, a lump sum, annual payments, or a combination of annual payments with lump sum
when the option is exercised. The latter is a particularly attractive alternative, because neither
party needs to fully anticipate the number and severity of interruptions over the entire contract
period (Hamilton, Whittlesey and Halverson, 1989). Sellers might be compensated in kind, for
example by lower rates for the buyer's production, as in the case of irrigation to hydroelectricity
generation transfers, farmers can be compensated by lowing rates for irrigation pumping
power.
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C. The market as a system for water allocation
The desirable characteristics for an ideal water allocation system include flexibility in the
allocation of water supplies, security of tenure for established water users, the capacity to
confront the water users with the full opportunity cost of water, predictability of the outcome of
the reallocation process, equatability and fairness, and the capacity to reflect collective, public
and social values (Howe, Schurmeier and Shaw, 1986b). Economic growth and efficiency
require a balance between flexibility and security. Although security of tenure can cause a
reduction of flexibility, and vice versa, both can be achieved simultaneously as long as users
can voluntarily respond to incentives for reallocating water supplies.
Water markets are flexible because they are by their very nature a decentralized and
incentive-oriented institution, rather than centralized and regulatory. Transferability of water
rights in the market provides the freedom to reallocate water as economic, social and
environmental demands and conditions change. "In a dynamic society with continually
changing values, it is this transferability which insures flexibility. Entrepreneurs continually have
new and better ideas of how to utilize resources. It is their offers to buy and sell these
resources that generate progress. If transferability is not allowed, there is no effective way for
the system to respond to changes in demand and supply" (Anderson, 1985).
With transferable water rights, marginal values for water, net of transaction and
conveyance costs, are equated across water users, uses, and locations. The equalization
occurs because the market provides both an incentive and a means for water users to
reallocate water rights to higher-value uses whenever reallocation would generate positive net
benefits. The transferability of water rights in the market enables new uses and users to
emerge and obtain water supplies, and prevents waste and encourages water conservation. It
also provides a continuous incentive for adoption, research and development of superior water
utilization, conservation and production technologies. A market based system of water
allocation will be, therefore, both resilient to shocks and open to take advantage of
opportunities.
Markets require security of tenure, which in turn helps encourage efficient use,
resource conservation, and capital investment. Security of tenure of water can also help
strengthen and consolidate the autonomy of water users organizations. Security of tenure and
the possibility to acquire water rights in the market encourage investment and growth in
activities that require secure water supplies. The fact that in a market water rights are
reallocated by voluntary exchanges allows market systems to defuse potential political conflicts
over water allocation (see Box 1).
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Box 1
Water markets and conflict resolution
Many studies consider only the economic benefits of
water marketing. There is, however, a political
dimension to the implementation of a system of
secure and transferable water rights. The definition
and clarification of property rights "offers significant
potential for minimising the costs of conflict of use in
multiple use resources" (Pearce, 1989). On the other
hand, markets can help defuse some of the intense
conflicts over water allocation.
"Market systems have a tendency to defuse
political conflict, largely because anyone who obtains
a resource must pay the prior owner a price that
satisfies that owner" (Williams, 1983). Market
transfers are always voluntary transactions in which
traders will only participate if they believe that it is in
their best interest given the alternative opportunities
available to them. Administrative allocation, in
contrast, often generates intense conflicts because
granting a water right to one user necessarily
precludes another and there is no automatic
pecuniary compensation for the basin of origin. Water
markets change the nature of
bargaining over water transfers: "instead of political
wrestling, with the losing region defeated by the
winning region, the bargaining can become a process
of mutually advantageous exchange" (Williams, 1983)
Markets, by providing incentives for water
conservation and wastewater treatment, can help
reduce conflicts between environmental interests and
water users. Ecological economists often prefer
property-right systems to pricing systems because
"property-right systems define the ecological limits
and then leave the market to work out what prices
and charges are necessary to keep use within those
limits across space and through time. On this view,
property-right systems tend to be ecologically more
dependable than pricing systems ... governments
routinely fail to vary prices in response to changing
economic conditions and opportunities ... When a
property-right is used to define the limit, however,
market processes take over. Value is determined by
market opportunity within ecological limits" (Young,
1997).
While market transactions guarantee security of tenure to buyers and sellers, the
rights of third parties are vulnerable to externalities from water transfers. If water users do not
face all the costs and benefits associated with their decisions, then their decisions may be
beneficial to them even though they are actually inefficient from an overall social perspective.
Thus, to ensure that market transfers do indeed produce net social benefits, water marketing
must be conducted in an institutional framework which causes the buyers and the sellers to
take account of third party impacts without unduly restricting water transferability.
A market directly confronts - by setting a market-clearing price and making current and
potential market participants aware of the ability to sell and buy at that price if desired - water
users with the real opportunity cost of their use and transfer decisions and forces them to
take this opportunity cost into account. "If the owner is to be fully aware of the opportunity costs
of his actions, property rights must be transferable. When the owner is not allowed to transfer
his resource to another use, he will not consider the full opportunity costs of the other use"
(Anderson, Terry, 1982). Water markets would correct deficiencies, therefore, in water
allocation irrespective of the water pricing policy followed by the authorities. "Since water would
be priced (in the rights market) at its opportunity cost to the user, it would tend to be efficiently
used even if the charges collected by the water authorities failed to cover resource cost in total
or at the margin" (Randall, 1981).
The principal advantage of a market is the ability to gather, process, and use
information effectively, an ability which is irreplaceable. Demand and supply conditions
continuously change, and this information is fragmented and dispersed among all actual and
potential water users and both time and place specific with a high variance across localized
ecosystems. If public authorities had the information necessary to make trade-offs between
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users, including information about the value of water in all alternative uses, and demand and
supply conditions for every user, regulatory policies could be determined to ensure efficient
resource allocation. Given that public authorities cannot acquire such information at a
reasonable cost, non-tradable water rights systems cannot achieve economic efficiency and
equity, and are likely to result in the allocation which is rigid over time and unresponsive to
changing social values (Howe, 1996 and 1997b). "There is no way that a well-intentioned
bureaucrat can know what constitutes a beneficial use without market transactions. It is the
trading of well-defined and enforced property rights which will enable individuals with 'the
knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place' ... to coordinate their knowledge"
(Anderson, 1985).
A continuous trade in water rights generates prices that by coordinating dispersed
information and preferences indicate the opportunity cost of water or its relative scarcity. Price
is an information-rich signal which summarizes all information available to market participants
and motivates appropriate levels of individual action in response to changing demand and
supply conditions, thus performing the crucial rationing function in allocating resources to
different uses and users. Thus, transferable water rights create a system of economic
incentives in which those who have the best knowledge about returns to water in their intended
use - water users themselves - are encouraged to use that knowledge to allocate water to
higher-value uses and hence maximize the economic value obtained from the scarce resource
with a minimum of bureaucratic apparatus. Obviously, the extent to which observed market
prices accurately measure the scarcity value of water and encourage its efficient allocation, will
depend upon the extent to which the characteristics of the market "approximate those of the
competitive paradigm" (Cummings and Nercissiantz, 1992).
Markets are predictable in the sense that resources are reallocated through
transactions which occur in response to changes in supply and demand, but the flexibility
sought through the market reduces future predictability. In the market the future prices in water
transfers, and hence the equilibrium distribution of water rights, are by definition unknown. As a
result, it is difficult, if not impossible, to anticipate how extensive the reallocation from one use
to another might be. While water markets can be introduced without undue delays and this
does not generally entail any major problems, it can be difficult and expensive, if not
impossible, to reverse the situation - "the irreversibility of the market decision also has to be
taken into account" (Kemper, 1996). If an undesirable situation arises, the government would
have either to buy back the rights, a complex and prohibitively expensive undertaking, or to
expropriate them, which is likely to be politically unfeasible and, if accomplished, has the
potential to undermine investors' confidence in the economy.
Water resources management should be actively adaptive, i.e., it should seek to learn
from experiences. If surprise outcomes are expected, initial market trading should probably be
conducted at a scale and under regulatory supervision to minimize the chance of irreversible,
adverse outcomes (Young, 1997). On this view, a slow evolutionary process can be an
advantage rather than a disadvantage. The initial steps should obviously be consistent with the
final design of the system. "Starting small gives both the institutions and the parties a chance to
adjust and to become familiar with the system. Since most initial efforts will be precedent
setting, it will take time to work them out. Once the precedents have been established,
however, the process will become smoother, quicker and better able to handle a larger number
of participants ... and trades" (Tietenberg, 1995). The experience in Chile suggests, however,
that by their nature water markets may evolve very slowly and this concern may not, therefore,
translate into reality.
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Market transactions are fair in the sense that water reallocation takes place through
voluntary mutually beneficial trades with perceived advantages for all the parties involved; each
party must be made better off or one would refrain from trading. Markets can guarantee
fairness only, however, if no single market participant can affect market prices. In addition,
unless conducted in an institutional framework which causes market participants to take into
account third party impacts, markets generally cannot guarantee fairness to third parties who
may be negatively affected by market transactions.
Since the future prices in water transfers and the equilibrium allocation are unknown
when a decision is made to introduce water rights transferability, the distributional implications
cannot be known beforehand. On the whole, there is no particular reason to expect that a
water market will necessarily result in an equitable allocation of water resources or change
income distribution in any particular way. If equity and other important collective, public or
social values
 related to water use are an important part of water policies, it may be necessary
to opt for some governmental regulation. These concerns can usually be accommodated within
the logic of the market system, for example, by purchasing water rights or reserving them in
the initial allocation of rights. On the other hand, concerns about equity should probably be
treated outside the market, though ultimately and in the long-run they are interrelated. The
problem is income distribution, not the mechanism for water allocation. On the whole, water
marketing is unlikely to create "new problems of unequal or unfair distribution beyond the reach
of government policy" (Scott and Coustalin, 1995).
Finally, although theoretically some goals for water allocation, such as predictability,
equity and fairness, and the need to reflect collective, public or social values, might be better
served by non-market institutions, the existence of these problems "does not necessary call for
a non-market alternative" (Anderson, Terry, 1982), because "market 'failure' in some abstract
sense does not mean that a nonmarket alternative will not also fail in the same or in some
other abstract sense" (Castle, 1965), hence the relevant comparison is between imperfect
market solutions and imperfect administrative or political solutions, rather than between
imperfect market solutions and the mirage of idealized administrative solutions.
D. Experience with water markets
The benefits of marketable water rights are not an illusion, they are confirmed by many
empirical, semi-empirical, and theoretical studies. Studies conducted in various countries have
estimated economic losses resulting from being unable to bring about market-based
reallocation of water from lower to higher value uses. These losses, or unrealized benefits of
water marketing, "represent the opportunity cost of failing to modify existing water institutions in
ways which will promote more economically efficient use of scarce ... water supplies" (Vaux,
1986). More significant evidence on the benefits of market allocation is provided, however,
from empirical studies of water markets in Chile, Spain and the United States of America.
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1. Water markets in Chile
The existence of secure property rights in water appears to have made a noticeable
contribution to the overall growth in the value of Chile's agricultural production since 1980. The
introduction of water markets coincided with a major increase in agricultural production and
productivity. The increase occurred within an agriculture largely dependent on irrigation, with no
significant increase in the area under irrigation. The influence of water markets, however,
cannot be fully separated from the effects of economic stability and other economic reforms,
especially trade liberalization and secure land rights. Trading does appear, however, to have
succeeded in reducing the need for new hydraulic infrastructure and improving overall irrigation
efficiency. Stronger property rights have also helped to consolidate the autonomy of water
users organizations (Bauer, 1997). On the other hand, less than 5% of water rights were
transferred over a 10 year period (Peña, 1996).
A study of market transfers of water rights in the Elqui and Limarí in northern Chile
showssubstantial economic gains from trade (Hearne and Easter, 1995). These gains occur
both in intersectoral trades and in trades between farmers. Economic gains from trade are
relatively modest in intersectoral trade in the Elqui river basin because water is being
transferred from profitable farmers to urban drinking water supply, so that even though the
financial gain to the seller is large, the economic gains of the reallocation are relatively small
because if water is not used by its owner, it will be used by other farmers downstream (see
Table 2). In the Limarí river basin, average gross and net gains from trade are estimated at
US$ 2.47 and US$ 2.40 per each cubic meter per year transferred, respectively.
Table 2
Gains from trade in the Elqui Valley, Chile
Number of Gains from trade (US$ per share)
shares traded Gross Net of transaction costs
Trades with the water utility 298 675 658
Other intersectoral trades 63 1 160 1 139
Intra-agricultural trades 351 934 839
Total/average 712 846 790
Source: Hearne and Easter (1995).
2. Water trading in the Huerta of Alicante, Spain
In the Huerta of Alicante, as in Chile, the ownership of water is separate from the ownership of
land. Water is distributed by rotation at a fixed rate, approximately the same quality of water in
each successive rotation, and the proportion of water available to any water right holder varies
for each rotation depending on the water rights acquired on each occasion (Maass and
Anderson, 1978). Before each rotation a notice is posted that announces the date on which the
rotation will commence and informs water rights holders that they should within a prescribed
period claim their "albalaes" or tickets for this rotation. Once allocated, tickets, available in
twelve denominations for a constant supply of water from 1 hour to 1/3 minute, are freely
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tradable in a public auction and an informal market. The community makes a genuine effort to
provide farmers with information so they can buy and sell water intelligently and there are
brokers who facilitate trading. A simulation model comparison of this system with those found
elsewhere in Spain, where trading is not permitted, indicates that the market approach adopted
in Alicante is the most efficient in terms of net increases in regional income. The differences
are not great with only a moderate water shortages, but are significant in conditions of severe
water shortage.
A comparison of several different short-run operating procedures, including the
marketing of water rights, for distributing irrigation water in terms of their impact on net
increases in regional income in Spain, using a composite of conditions in Murcia and Valencia,
and in the United States, using a composite of conditions in Colorado and Utah, indicated that
of the procedures that do not depend on full seasonal storage, markets and priorities by type of
crop are the most efficient (Maass and Anderson, 1978). The latter procedure, however, is very
inequitable and has been used only as a short-term response in severe droughts, while a
market procedure ranks high in equity. The results show that markets are the most efficient of
all the stream flow procedures considered, and that the conventional wisdom that the
procedures "that rank high in efficiency will do poorly in distributing income equally among
beneficiaries while those that do well in distributive equality will be inefficient ... does not apply
to a wide variety of conditions in irrigation agriculture" (Maass and Anderson, 1978).
3. Water markets in the United States
Water markers are functioning in many western states of the United States. A comparative
study of water markets in the states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico,
and Utah demonstrated that: (i) these markets are an important water allocation mechanism in
many areas and are likely to become more widespread; (ii) they appear to be relatively efficient
in allocating water among uses recognized as beneficial in state water codes with transfer
patterns clearly indicating a movement from lower to higher-value uses; (iii) third party effects
involving consumptive water users, i.e., return flow externalities, are generally reflected in
market decisions and prices, but not so instream flow, water quality and other values that are
not represented in water rights; and (iv) water markets typically deviate substantially from the
competitive market model (see Table 3), and observed market prices may serve as only a
rough approximation of the social value of additional water supplies (Saliba and Bush, 1987;
Saliba, 1987; Saliba et al., 1987).
Studies of individual systems show similarly favourable results in efficiency. The
irrigation water rental market in the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District and five
major irrigation companies in the South Platte basin has resulted in substantial efficiencies and
allowed the avoidance of considerable losses in crop production (Anderson, 1961). It has also
reduced the waste that occurs when water users become involved in costly, time-consuming
legal conflicts. The rules and customs developed for water transfers "make possible a better
adjustment of the land-water relationship than is normally found in western irrigated agriculture.
They might well serve as examples for other areas in adjusting for the varying needs of water
users" (Anderson, 1961).
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A review of two decades of market activity in the Lower Rio Grande Valley of Texas
found active water marketing practices with significant volumes of agricultural water having
been transferred to municipal and industrial use (Chang and Griffin, 1992). Analysis of
representative market transactions indicated that municipal benefits from water marketing far
exceeded agricultural opportunity costs. The study estimates municipal benefits from trades at
about US$ 5 000 to US$ 17 000 per 1 000 cubic meters compared with the lost water values to
irrigators which range from US$ 249 to US$ 1 894 per 1 000 cubic meters under optimistic
agricultural circumstances.
Table 3
Restrictions in water markets





Market participants or public agencies
restrict price levels and other conditions
of market transfer, and observed prices
may reflect these restrictions.
Uncertainty Uncertainty regarding future water
supplies, demand, and the legal
framework that governs water transfers






Market prices do not take into account
the values of parties external to the





Economic and legal barriers to market
participation can create inequitable
access to water. Water allocation
decisions may serve as a form of
conflict resolution and be made on
political rather than economic grounds.
Market prices may not fully reflect these
considerations.
Source: Saliba et al. (1987).
A study of four irrigation companies in Utah found considerable gains from increasing
the area in which trading was permitted (Gardner and Fullerton, 1968). Before 1948, only
intracompany trading of water was permitted. In 1948, it became possible to transfer water
between companies as well as within each company. Allowing intercompany transfers of
irrigation water increased rental prices - reflecting the value of marginal product associated with
the years before and after the change to an intercompany transfer policy in 1948 - three times
(at constant market prices) between 1934-1941 and 1950-1964.
In 1991, California was in the midst of its fifth consecutive year of drought and the
major water facilities were forced to significantly reduce water deliveries. In response to this
emergency, the state government directed the Department of Water Resources to establish
and operate a temporary Drought Emergency Water Bank to centralize the reallocation of
water from sellers to buyers with critical needs on a short-term basis (see Box 2). The bank, in
both physical and financial terms, generated the largest annual set of regional water trades to
occur until that time in the United States and possibly in the world (Howitt, 1994). It helped
alleviate extreme drought conditions across California. The net financial benefits of its
operations were estimated at US$ 105.82 million. Water marketing also had a positive effect
on employment resulting in the net state-wide gain of 3 741 jobs. The water bank was set-up
again in 1992, 1994 and 1995 but on a smaller scale, and is expected to be implemented in the
event of future droughts.
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Box 2
The 1991 Drought Water Bank in California
Buyer participation was open to corporations, mutual
water companies, and public agencies, except the
Department of Water Resources (DWR). Buyers were
required to meet rigorous criteria to qualify as having
critical needs. Sellers were assured that transfers
would not affect the standing of their water rights and
would not be a basis for any loss or forfeiture of these
rights, and that transfers would constitute a beneficial
use of water and would not constitute evidence of
waste or unreasonable use. To motivate early sales,
purchase contracts contained a price escalator
clause, that provided that if, by a specified date, the
average price in similar transactions exceeded the
prices in the contract by 10%, the seller would be
entitled to the higher of the two prices.
The DWR set up a Water Purchase Committee,
comprised of representatives from potential water
purchasers, to negotiate the terms and conditions of a
model contract for buying water. The committee and
government agencies at all levels worked with the
DWR to negotiate contracts, provide centralized
control of water transfers, and coordinate distribution.
When the water purchase contract was developed,
participants anticipated that demands would exceed
available supplies. Priorities were established,
therefore, to assure that the most urgent needs were
satisfied first.
Since at the start of the banking programme
purchases focused on water from fallowed farmland,
the initial purchasing price - about US$ 0.10 per cubic
meter - was set so as to provide a net income to the
farmers similar to what they would have earned from
farming plus an additional amount to encourage them
to enter into a contract with the bank. Once trading
intensified, it proved difficult to change this price. As a
result, the bank paid the same prices for water from
all sellers. The price was considerably reduced when
water supply and demand conditions improved.
The 1991 bank bought over 1.0 billion cubic
meters of water through 348 contracts for
approximately US$ 100 million. The bank charged
about 0.14 US$/m³ for water delivered at the State
Water Project's Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta
pumping plant. This price covered: the purchase
price, the costs involved in satisfying outflow
requirements to move the water through the Delta
(this reduced the net amount of water available for
delivery), and administrative, monitoring and
enforcement costs. The bank sold about 480 million
cubic meters of water to 12 purchasers, some 80%
was for municipal and industrial uses, and the rest for
agriculture. The Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California, serving the city of Los Angeles,
bought over half the water.
The fact that water was bought from many
sources required substantial coordination to match
storage and delivery operations with available
supplies. To minimize alterations in the operation of
conveyance and storage system operations and
maximize direct delivery of water bank supplies as
they became available, water from the various
sources was pooled and retained in the conveyance
and storage system until the most opportune time for
delivery. Considerable efforts were made to minimize
negative environmental impacts.
On the whole, particularly given the crisis nature
of the programme, the bank was an overall success.
It provided an effective regulated market which
reallocated water to users with critical needs at
minimum cost. It succeeded in moving California from
a condition of drought emergency to one in which all
critical needs were met. Negative economic effects
were minimal, and overall the bank generated
substantial gains for California's agriculture and
economy. Bank operations also provided some
benefits to fish and wildlife.
Important lessons of the generally successful
experience with water banking in California are that:
(i) water banks can substantially reduce transaction
costs and risks; (ii) the actual quantity of water
reallocated through the programme was small in
relation to the total use, but the price charged for this
water set a value for all water which had a potential
for being transferred; (iii) both water demand and
supply were more price elastic than had been
estimated before establishment of the bank; (iv) the
number of buyers was much lower than the number of
sellers, but the fixing of prices removed any potential
monopoly power that the buyers may have had; and
(v) water markets do not inherently require long lead
times to put into operation.
Source: California Department of Water Resources (1991), Frederick (1993), Howitt (1994) and (1997), Israel
and Lund (1995), McCarthy (1996), Thompson (1992), U.S. Office of Technology Assessment
(1993), and Water Facts Group (1996).
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II. Designing a water market
The decision to introduce a system of tradeable water rights requires the consideration of may
issues so that the water market can function smoothly and equitably. One of the most
important questions is the initial allocation of rights involving both the consideration of the
acquired rights of existing water users and of the need to limit any windfall gains. It is
necessary to ensure that once allocated the right is clearly and securely defined and
appropriately registered. The establishment of individual rights must not come at the expense
of society as a whole. Whatever decisions are taken and policies adopted the system must be
as simple as possible, rights and obligations clearly defined and the intervention of government
kept to a minimum.
A. The initial allocation of water rights
The introduction of a tradable water rights system requires the prior determination of the total
number of water rights to be allocated and of the method of their distribution. The approach
taken in the initial allocation can have a substantial impact upon the implementation and
efficiency of the subsequent use of water marketing as the main means for water allocation.
The magnitude of the political opposition to policy changes is usually proportional to the
magnitude of any uncompensated redistribution associated with that policy. How rights are
allocated is crucial to the acceptance or rejection of a water market by different groups of water
users, "schemes which are elegant in an economic, engineering, or administrative sense but
politically unacceptable can not be seriously considered" (David et al., 1980).
1. Principal issues
A powerful theoretical feature of water marketing in a setting with many buyers and sellers, full
information, zero transaction costs and other stringent assumptions, is that the final allocation
of water rights will be the same regardless of their initial distribution. On this view, the initial
allocation of water rights does not make any difference, except for equity considerations, for as
long as there are markets where the rights are freely transferable the equilibrium allocation will
be the same. At least in theory, this "implies that under the right conditions the initial allocation
can be used to pursue distributional goals without interfering with cost-effectiveness"
(Tietenberg, 1995).
In the presence of significant transaction costs, however, when information,
bargaining, contracting and enforcement are not costless, and where there is market power or
resource immobility, the initial distribution of water rights can and does affect the efficiency with
which a water market will reach equilibrium. The initial distribution of water rights can matter to
the quantity of transactions, the equilibrium allocation of rights, and the aggregate benefits of
water marketing. If transaction costs are sufficiently large to preclude trade, the initial resource
allocation will be retained as the equilibrium solution (Randall, 1983). These considerations
suggest that there is a trade-off between promoting efficiency and equity considerations in the
initial distribution of water rights.
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Alternative initial assignments of water rights among individual users, local
governments, environmental protection agencies, ethnic groups, etc. will result in entirely
different sets of bargaining relationships and different patterns of water use and transfers
(Saliba, 1987). Market outcomes depend on the initial distribution of rights, as "a given
distribution of endowments (rights) will give rise to one set of market outcomes, but a different
distribution of endowments will give rise to a different set of outcomes, and both sets of
outcomes are considered ... efficient" and "there is no economic efficiency basis to compare
the relative merits of" both outcomes (Chan, 1995).
Markets reallocate water rights through voluntary transfers between willing buyers and
sellers, but the distributional impacts of market transactions - how the scarcity rents from water
are distributed, who has the protection of the State to use water as they wish, who must pay to
obtain water rights, and who receives payments - depend on the initial allocation of water rights
and bargaining power. It is the role of the political process to define the institutional regime
which will determine the form of distribution of the rent and this choice should be made
explicitly with both efficiency and equity (distributional) goals and constraints in mind (Bowen,
Moncur and Pollock, 1991).
Care needs to be taken to respect and not to affect the rights of disadvantaged
groups, such as poor farmers and indigenous peoples. There is a need to draw attention to the
proposed system for the distribution and recognition of existing of rights through campaigns of
public information, as well as to offer legal and technical advice and to provide assistance to
disadvantaged groups. In Chile, for example, the government has a programme to facilitate the
legalization of the property titles to water rights; it has been spending more than US$ 0.32
million annually for this purpose (Ríos and Quiroz, 1995).
One issue which must be addressed in the initial policy process is the possibility of
large and questionable windfall gains that might accrue to water users, who obtained water
from publicly funded infrastructure developments, and whether the government should try to
recover the capital costs of historical public investment in water-related infrastructure. Various
solutions have been proposed to deal with such undesirable windfalls. These range from
outright prohibitions of transfers and other restrictions on trading, which if adopted are likely to
result in inefficient resource allocation and stifle incentives to transfer and conserve water
resources, to allowing transfers without any restrictions, which will facilitate the reallocation of
water to higher value uses, but at the expense of windfall gains to original users. Intermediate
positions include the imposition of a windfall tax, dividing the windfall according to a formula
which encourages transfers and yet permits the government to share in it (Gould, 1989), and
greater reliance on alternative mechanisms for initial allocation, such as auctions. Whatever
the approach adopted, it should not render inoperable the vital mechanism that encourages
efficiency through market transfers - water users need a financial inventive to participate in
water marketing. Subsidies and other public policies, which affect returns to water, distort water
use and transfer decisions by allowing their beneficiaries to ignore the real cost of their water.
The removal of subsidies should both increase the quantity of water rights users are willing to
trade and reduce prices.
In the initial allocation of water rights, consideration should be given to establishing
minimum flows to protect aquatic and riparian habitats, and other uses which, because of
strong public goods characteristics, cannot compete in the market for water. Where an initial
allocation of water rights for minimum flow maintenance is not possible because historic uses
have preempted the total supply, an argument can be made for a one time reallocation of
27
water rights from current offstream uses to instream use as a means of redressing past policy
deficiencies which resulted in over-allocation to offstream uses (Griffin and Boadu, 1992). In
Chile, although no provision of this kind is included in the law, new water rights can be granted
only if this does not affect the rights of third parties and, in recent years, the interpretation of the
rights of third parties has been expanded to include environmental protection and ecological
flows (Peña, 1996).
A similar argument can be constructed for a one-timer reapportionment of water in
favour of any disadvantaged groups as a means of redressing past policy deficiencies. If a
decision is made to undertake such a realignment, it is particularly important to assure water
users that the government will be reluctant to intervene in the future, because "further threat of
intervention can only undermine decentralized policies and encourage unproductive
expropriative effort and defensive action" (Griffin and Boadu, 1992). An alternative would be for
the government to enter the market to acquire water rights for the desired purpose.
2. Alternative procedures
In introducing a water market where administrative allocation has been the system previously
applied, a government may choose one of two main ways to distribute water rights to water
users. Water users could be granted water rights free of charge based on some regulatory
distribution rule, usually the historic record of possession of permits for water use existing
under the old system, "grandfathering", or, where such evidence is lacking, according to other
benchmarks, such as land holdings. The second alternative would be for the government to
sell water rights. The sale, to be equitable and to be able to match supply and demand, would
have to be through auctions as the valuation of the water rights is unknown. A combination of
these two approaches can also be used, such as allocating a proportion of the previously
recognized water rights free of charge on the basis of historic use and the rest by auction.
Leasing is possible but less attractive because it is likely to fail to provide a high level of
security to holders and to reduce post-allocation investment.
Although basing the initial allocation of water rights on historic water use is the easiest
and the most commonly used system, governments could achieve greater efficiency gains
from the system by auctioning all rights to the highest bidder, but this alternative presents
potentially high political costs. Grandfathering represents effectively a transfer of wealth to
existing water users. Auctions ensure that the wealth represented by water rights is transferred
to the society as a whole and windfalls are avoided. "The auction solution would give some
concrete meaning to the vague proposition, so much a part of current water law, that the
unappropriated waters ... belong to 'the public'. An auction would enable the public to realize on
that purported ownership - now a matter of rhetoric - in the form of receipts flowing into the
state treasury" (Williams, 1983). Existing users prefer grandfathering to auctions because by
preserving the status quo, it can serve as a barrier for the entry of new users, thus raising
existing users' profits. On the other hand, it can be argued that because the ability to transfer
water rights provides a new asset to holders, it is reasonable for the government to be able to
sell at least some of the rights.
Selection of the procedure for initial allocation raises a number of other equity
questions: (i) whether equity should only apply to exiting water users, in which case the free
initial distribution approach becomes more attractive (there is also a question of equity between
existing and future water users, which at least in theory can be partially resolved by reserving
some rights for new users), or to all citizens, in which case sales of water rights to users might
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be acceptable if the revenues go into the general revenue fund; (ii) whether water users should
have to pay for water rights at all; and (iii) whether and how environmental and other instream
interests can enter the allocation procedures (Lyon, 1982).
With auctions, water rights will tend to go to those to whom they are most valuable,
hence an auction promotes efficiency, although this will depend on the detailed design of the
auction. Under grandfathering, in contrast, water rights remain in their historic uses which are
not necessarily those with the highest value, while new users must purchase rights in the
market. Grandfathering imposes extra costs on new users, preserves inefficient patters of
water use, as well as reduces the rate of entry of new users and hence retards rather then
promotes technological change. On the other hand, by providing an asset to an existing water
user wishing to sell, it could conceivably facilitate adjustment and resource mobility.
Grandfathering also provides ample opportunity for administrative discretion and
strategic manipulation unless the allocation is based upon information that is extremely difficult
to manipulate, and hence invites lobbying efforts to protect vested interests and maintain the
status quo and may give perverse incentives to existing rights holders. For instance,
anticipation of grandfathering could encourage users to expand their withdrawals in order to
qualify for more water rights. If regulators do not act to prevent such strategic behaviour, the
system can reward the least efficient users. In contrast, auctions not only prevent such
negative consequences and mitigate the appearance of favouritism or secret negotiations, but
also remove the incentive for the water users and other interest groups to engage in
rent-seeking activities which waste resources. Auctions also readily identify appropriate prices
and make the value of water more explicit at the moment of introducing a market.
Grandfathering tends to place a large proportion of water rights in the hands of largest
water users. This may be a particular problem with public utilities. Allocating a large share of
the available water supply to colluding users can lead to the problem of imperfect competition
and market power. By subsequently restricting the supply of rights to the market, these users
could exercise market power, while at the same time erecting a barrier to the entry of new
users, who, having to pay a premium to acquire the necessary rights would begin at a
competitive disadvantage (Bertram, 1992).
Auctions may, however, provide only a partial solution to these difficulties. Since
bidders will make offers subject to their budget constraints, which "are the key to bidding
strength, access to finance would be a powerful factor in determining the identities of
successful bidders" (Bertram, 1992). Thus, a bidder or group of bidders with financial
advantage not being related to the ability to put water to highest value use could conceivably
gain a large share of the initially auctioned water rights, and by subsequently restricting the
supply of rights to the secondary market, could exercise market power.
Finally, the main advantage of grandfathering is that it avoids conflicts and reduces the
opposition of existing water users, typically farmers, to the introduction of a market. Farmers
usually argue, and not without reason, that they are entitled to receive water rights without
charge because they have already paid for the rights implicitly in the purchase price of the land.
With the assignment of rights on the basis of historical use, there is no financial burden from
the payment for water rights, the fact that may explain at least in part why the auction approach
has not been widely adopted. Under the auction approach, although payments for rights do not
represent real economic costs to society as a whole, but merely transfers from one group to
another, to the users, they constitute a financial burden.
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In practice, most countries have recognized existing water uses at the time of
assignment of property rights to water to protect existing uses and to prevent opposition to the
policy change. There may be, however, some merit in trying to, at least partly, rectify some of
the deficiencies in the existing distribution of water rights, but there are obvious limits to the
ability and willingness of any government to do this because "if the government were to try to
use this opportunity to correct all such mistakes or to confiscate all illegally obtained rights,
there is a good chance that the law will be blocked and the injustices continue" (Thobani,
1997).
Auctioning water rights to the highest bidder has many attractive characteristics, but it
has difficulties of its own, including the lack of familiarity with auctions among potential buyers,
the danger that bidding for water rights may fail to be competitive, etc. Auctions can also bring
problems of a "public choice" nature, i.e., the ability and willingness of the public sector to
organize and conduct auctions with efficient and equitable outcomes (Bowen, Moncur and
Pollock, 1991). Potential issues include the equal treatment of public and private water users,
the influence of special interest groups, and the fact that the need to raise additional revenues
can lead the government to over-allocate water rights or to allow their concentration in the
hands of few users. For this reason, it is preferable that the agency that determines the volume
of water rights to be allocated should not stand to profit from an increase in their number.
If public authorities are concerned not only with economic efficiency, but also with
equity effects or regional economic development, it is important to ensure that the use of
auctions does not conflict with such goals. Public policy objectives other than revenue
maximization, such as protecting existing or implied rights to the resource, can be addressed
through appropriate design of the auction process (Morgan, 1995). This protection can take
various forms, such as reserving some water rights for designated bidders, allowing them to
pay in instalments, and using price preferences to facilitate the acquisition of rights by
designated bidders. In theory at least, price preferences should not materially affect total
revenues because non-designated bidders will face greater competition, and, therefore, pay
higher prices.
3. National experiences in the initial allocation of rights
When market allocation of water has been introduced, the initial allocation of rights has almost
always been based on the recognition of the formal and informal water use permits or licenses
already held. Future efficiency in water use and allocation is per se ensured by the
transferability of rights. Under grandfathering, therefore, an efficient secondary market is
essential to fulfil the dual role of correcting the inefficiencies inherent in the initial allocation
process and to provide a mechanism for the allocation to adjust to changing supply and
demand conditions in the longer term (Morgan, 1995).
Where there is a well-functioning registry of water rights and where there is sufficient
water to honour all water rights, it is usually sufficient to recognize all existing rights once water
users reregister them in a property rights register (Holden and Thobani, 1995). If the volume of
water rights exceeds available supply, rights would have to be assigned on the basis of historic
use, need - the complications that can arise are well illustrated by the apparently simple
solution adopted in Colorado (Box 3), land area, or according to other benchmarks.
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Box 3
The allocation of supplemental water supplies in the Northern
Colorado Water Conservancy District
The completion of the Colorado-Big Thompson
project, in 1957, made available the new water
supplies to the Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District. The District decided to allocate
the new water rights on the basis of the future users'
needs and possibilities of putting the water to
beneficial use.
Users were asked to present applications which
were processed in the order in which they were
received. Since the number of applications exceeded
the amount of the water rights available for allocation,
latecomers were placed on a waiting list, and their
applications were considered as other users declined
their initial allocation.The allocation of water rights
was based on an analysis by the District of how much
supplemental water the applicant would be able to put
to beneficial use. In the case of farmers, the main
criteria used in the analysis were the soil type, the
historical cropping pattern, and the already existing
water supply. The
process included visits to the applicants' farms and
physical inspections.
Although water rights were allocated free of
charge, the beneficiaries had to place a lien on their
property against a repayment obligation to the federal
government (the project was financed with a
long-term government loan). The risk of lien
constituted an implicit price and some users decided
not to participate in the allocation process for fear of
losing their properties if the District failed to meet its
payment obligations. To cover the repayment
obligation and operating expenses, all water rights
holders pay an annual assessment based on the
number of rights owned.
Linking the allocation of water to the repayment of
the project debt favoured relatively wealthy applicants,
because only those who were able and willing to put
up their property as collateral could participate in the
allocation.
Source: Cestti and Kemper (1995).
Allocating water rights on the basis of existing land rights might work fairly well where
the distribution of land is reasonably equitable (Easter and Feder, 1996). If land ownership is
highly concentrated or perceived as inequitable, an alternative water allocation criteria would be
needed. For example, water rights could be allocated to all families, both landowners and
landless, in the irrigated area so that all share directly in the economic surplus created by the
reform (Easter and Hearne, 1995).
In Chile, at the time of the promulgation of the 1981 Water Code which reintroduced
and amplified private property rights in water, the initial allocation of water rights was based on
the water rights held prior to their nationalization under the agrarian reform. These rights could
be overridden, however, in favour of those who had been making "effective" use of the right for
the five years prior to the promulgation of the law. The availability of relatively good records
held by user associations facilitated the allocation process and made it possible to honour the
historic allocation (Cestti and Kemper, 1995). It is estimated, however, that even now
somewhere between 50 to 65% of water rights are not legally registered (Ríos and Quiroz,
1995). The most important reasons for this are that all rights are noted in the books of water
user associations and rights are not lost through failure to register. This removes any real
incentive to register the rights unless someone wishes to sell. Water rights were, and still are,
assigned to the applicant without charge and without any obligation that the water be put to any
use. The Dirección General de Aguas (DGA) must grant requests for new rights whenever
there is water physically available and the rights of third parties are not affected. It has no
administrative discretion to decide among competing solicitants except by holding auctions.
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Other countries have also adopted the grandfathering approach. In Mexico, water
rights are allocated on the basis of the formal and informal water rights already held (Holden
and Thobani, 1995). Many rights remain unregistered due to the complex and slow registration
procedures, unwillingness on the part of informal users to regularize their situation because of
fears of fines, the fact that users often do not have the documents required for registration,
users apply for larger volumes of water than they are entitled to, and others claim that they
cannot afford or are not willing to pay fines and registration fees (World Bank, 1996).
There are examples of the use of auctions for the allocation of water rights not
allocated in an initial allocation process or made available as a result of new publicly-funded
infrastructure development (Box 4). In Chile, auctions can be used for assigning rights, and
must be used where there are two or more simultaneous applications for rights over the same
water, as well as, for unclaimed rights made available as a result of publicly financed
infrastructure projects. In practice, few have been held (El Diario, 1996). In Peru, a similar
approach has been proposed in the draft water law which provides that rights to new or
unallocated water are to be allocated via public auction (Holden and Thobani, 1995).
Auctioning would begin based on a minimum price and if only one party is interested in the
right, it will be awarded at this price (World Bank, 1994).
B. Permanent versus time-limited water rights
Water rights can be permanent or time limited. Theoretically, as long as the rights are freely
transferable, either option is acceptable, because their transferability will permit rights to be
reallocated to higher-value uses in response to changing economic and social conditions. The
choice of duration of the right, however, determines how easy it is to organize a market, at
what level of transaction costs it will operate, and perhaps more important, the nature of
incentives water users will face to invest in the development and conservation of water
resources.
Permanent water rights are often preferred for two principal reasons. On the one hand,
the homogeneous nature of rights, i.e., all rights are of the same duration, simplifies market
creation and reduces transaction costs. On the other hand, and perhaps more important, since
protected rights to the use of water are a crucial element in promoting investment, a system of
time-limited water rights is likely to fail to provide the necessary degree of security to promote
long-term investment and planning, and protect the stability of long-term financial
arrangements related to economic development which depend on secure access to water
resources. It can also introduce legal and economic uncertainty in water resource management
and can be difficult to implement because of the rigidity of the infrastructure already in place, to
say nothing of the political difficulties of terminating rights. Every outstanding water right
represents: (i) an established business that relies upon water; and (ii) many people, including
employees, customers, backward- and forward-linked industries, etc., that depend upon the
business. "To take away its water, and thus its chance to exist, would be wasteful and terribly




Auctions in the allocation of supplemental water supplies
in the state of Victoria, Australia
The completion of a new dam made 35 000
megalitres of water available for allocation to water
users in the form of 15-year diversion licences. A
number of methods were considered to allocate the
licences. The initial decision to require sealed bids
was discarded because of strong resistance from
farmers in favour of a more open auction process.
Subsequently, during 1988 and early 1989, the Rural
Water Commission of Victoria (RWC) sponsored six
auctions. The auctions were perceived as an efficient
and equitable mechanism to allocate limited water
supplies to their highest value use.
The auction was qualified to facilitate the
acquisition of licences by small farmers, prevent large
farming companies from purchasing large quantities,
and improve the public acceptability of the approach.
This makes Victoria's experience particularly
interesting to Latin American countries where small
subsistence farmers often exist side-by-side with
modern farming enterprises and large landowners.
The following rules were adopted:
 • Participants had to complete a preregistration
form indicating the maximum volume of water that
they were interested in acquiring and its intended
use.
 • Participation was limited to private irrigators with
legal access to the river from which the water was
available and to land owners or lessees in the
basin. Users in public irrigation districts and urban
areas, and speculators were not eligible to
participate in the auctions.
 • A reserve price of $AUS 100 per megalitre was
established but not disclosed at the auctions. It
was based on a conservative estimation of the
financial value of water in growing a relatively low
value crop. The fact that the price underestimated
the value of the water was attributed to the need
to sustain interest in and ensure acceptance of
the auction process.
 • Purchases by any single land holding were limited
to 10% of the volume being offered. Anyone with
multiple land holdings could purchase more than
the 10% limit.
 • The volumes of water offered for sale were
broken into "stages" or minimum purchases,
e.g., Stage 1: 1 megalitres; Stage 2:
10 megalitres; ... Stage 7: 200 megalitres.
Bidders were required to make at least the
minimum purchase corresponding to the stage in
which they participated. They could participate in
several or all stages, but had to preregister to
make at least the minimum purchase in a
particular stage.
 • Bidders competed on the basis of their
willingness to pay for 1 megalitre. The highest
bidder could purchase the volume of water
desired at this price. Other bidders were allowed
to purchase any remaining water at the same
price. If they desired more water than what was
available, bidding was reopened.
Of the 31 000 megalitres offered for sale, 23 000
megalitres were sold through auction. Prices varied
from $AUS 775 per megalitre in the first auction, to
$AUS 100 per megalitre in later auctions, with the
bulk of the water purchased at the reserve price or
slightly higher. Lower prices were paid for larger
volumes of water, and higher prices for smaller
volumes, usually bought for the production of high
value crops. A quarter of the 200 successful bidders
were new irrigators, about one-half of whom bought
20 megalitres or less. All the water offered in the first
two auctions was sold, but not in the later auctions.
As a result, eligibility was expanded to include users
from other basins, in an effort to encourage
competition and to "broaden the market", but water
still remained unsold. Demand and prices declined as
more auctions took place. The reserve price become
known before the later auctions were held and bidders
became unwilling to bid higher that this amount.
The effect of the restrictions in the auction was an
improvement in equity but at the expense of
introducing a degree of inefficiency. Competition was
constrained, the chances of transferring greater
volumes to higher value uses were reduced, the
benefits for public finance were limited, and it was not
possible to extract all of the gains from trade.
Source: Simon and Anderson (1990) and Cestti and Kemper (1995).
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Property rights in water in most markets have, therefore, perpetual duration, as for
example in Chile and the western United States, although, given the rules of abandonment and
forfeiture for non-use, in the later case they can be more precisely described as "of indefinite
duration" (Trelease, 1974). It has been argued, however, that a system of time-limited water
rights can have its attractions.
First, to the extent that water rights may be initially granted on the basis of historic use
("grandfathering"), the negative effects associated with this method of initial allocation would be
mitigated under a system of time-limited rights. Specifically, time-limited rights could both
reduce the risk of large water users gaining market power and the need for regulation to
ensure that such market imperfections are avoided. The limited duration of rights implies that
an alternative allocation methods can be established when the present rights expire
(David et al., 1980).
Second, potential future water management policy changes (e.g., the introduction of
minimum or ecological flow requirements, changing political and social values regarding
alternative water uses, the potential effects of permanent or very long-term rights on the
sustainability of the resource given uncertainties in scientific understanding of the extent of the
resources, etc.) could be accommodated more easily, perhaps, under a system of time-limited
rights. Permanent rights or rights of very long duration promote investments and allow
long-term planning by holders, and thus encourage economically efficient decisions. They are,
however, expensive, if not impossible, to recapture by the government whereas short-term
rights may simply not be reissued when they expire (Eheart and Lyon, 1983). Once permanent
rights are granted it is very difficult to reverse the situation created, particularly when the
capacity to impose ex post conditions is limited.
Any potential administrative flexibility offered by time-limited rights comes, however, at
the expense of a corresponding increase in uncertainty for the water right holder. Water
markets depend on secure ownership rights. If a system of time-limited water rights is used,
rights would have to be of sufficient duration to provide reasonable security to holders, to allow
sufficient time to amortize capital investment and, also, to provide adequate incentives to
invest. Very short term rights not only discourage long-term investments and planning, and
increase uncertainty, but can also create tension between public authorities and water rights
holders, heighten conflict rather than cooperation amongst water users, exacerbate the
uncertainties of the regulatory playing field, and most fundamentally, make financing long-term
capital investment very risky and costly (Vogel, 1997).
In the same way, attempts to impose ex post conditionalities on permanent rights to
accommodate changing economic and social demands and conditions, if not implemented
carefully, have the potential to generate uncertainty and undermine the market. With rights of
sufficient duration, a system of fixed-term rights can strike a balance between the need to
provide security to investors and the need to provide flexibility by making the rights subject to
periodic review. Very long terms, however, would probably turn into permanent rights.
One option to address the trade-off between uncertainty and flexibility is to issue water
rights in a staggered patters over n years such that one nth of the rights expire in any given
year (Eheart and Lyon, 1983). It has also been proposed to issue water rights with different
durations. Water users undertaking water-related investments with long payback periods and
willing to pay for the security that long-term water rights afford would be able to hedge against
the risks of future policy changes by buying water rights for longer periods. Both approaches,
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perhaps particularly the second, share a disadvantage stemming from the heterogeneous
nature of rights with different durations which could make it difficult to organize the market and
increase transaction costs.
If a right is to have time limitations, this must be clearly defined as a part of the right
(Simpson, 1994a). In addition, if the market is to allocate water rights efficiently, the duration of
rights should not be subject to any particular actions on the part of the user (Eheart and Lyon,
1983). It should be recognized that limitations on the term of water rights, their renewability as
well as other restrictions on the type of use that can be made of them lessen their value for the
water users and discourage transfers.
Time-limited water rights are used in Mexico, where, under the "Ley de Aguas
Nacionales" of 1 December 1992, the utilization of water resources is through "concessions"
granted to private individuals or corporations, and "assignments" granted to federal, state and
municipal entities. Concessions and assignments can be granted for renewable periods of
from 5 to 50 years. The average term has been more than 30 years to ensure security of the
water right (Rosegrant and Gazmuri, 1994).
C. Hydrological security and allocation rules
The fact that any water supply is variable in time and space affects the hydrological security of
water rights, which in turn affects their market value. It is for this reason that water rights that
draw on water resources characterized by low variability, such as high-volume perennial
streams, groundwater aquifers or large lakes and reservoirs with known and steady average
inflow are more valuable than the rights drawing on highly variable resources or where supplies
cannot be accurately estimated. Changes in the hydrologic capacity of the water resource can
cause the yield of a particular water right to diverge from the full limit of the right. For this
reason, water rights holders are concerned with the allocation rules which relate available
water supplies to individual users' permitted withdrawals or consumption, and hence determine
the reliability of the nominal quantity specified in the water right.
Risk management and reallocation is one of the dominant motivations for water
transfers which are viewed by many water users as a means of acquiring more protection
against hydrological variability than their current water rights holdings provide. For instance,
one of the most typical market transactions is the purchase of irrigation rights by water utilities
which seek to protect current and future customers against supply fluctuations. Other water
users who pay close attention to security of supply include industrial water providers and
farmers with orchards and other permanent crops.
Allocation rules are the institutional response to the need to make water rights
relatively secure. The way in which allocation rules are defined determines how easy it is to
organize a market for transferable water rights and how the risks associated with water
shortages are shared among rights holders (Colby, 1988). While there are many ways to
allocate water supplies, the major alternatives are priority allocation and proportional rules.
Water right systems often combine elements of both methods.
Under a priority rule, water rights are defined in terms of two parameters, size and
priority. Priorities may be determined in terms of time of use, type of use, for example, drinking
water supply versus irrigation, or location (Easter and Tsur, 1995). Type of use and location
priorities are difficult to reconcile with flexibility in water allocation and the transferability of water
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rights. The most common priority rule is that reflected in the prior appropriation doctrine of the
western United States which operates on the "first in time, first in right" principle. Under the
prior appropriation doctrine, in times of water shortage, senior rights holders are satisfied to the
exclusion of junior rights holders with the latest appropriators being cut off in inverse historic
order until demand equals supply. Since priority date affects the number of days and seasons
of the year during which water can be used, and hence determines the reliability of the right
relative to other rights, rights with earlier priority dates usually command higher prices than
rights with later priority dates (Colby, Crandall and Bush, 1993).
Under a proportional rule, water rights are defined in terms of a fraction of the available
flow or of the water available in a reservoir or lake or in terms of shifts or hours of availability at
a certain intake. All water rights holders have equal priority sharing available water based on
the proportion of rights held. Thus, all water users drawing water from the same sources share
the insecurity inherent in variable water supplies. In Chile, in the water law, rights are defined in
volumetric terms, but in times of shortage, the law allows for water to be distributed
proportionally to the number of rights held. In practice, however, the generally high variability of
natural river flows and lack of significant storage capacity limit volumetric allocation. In
consequence, water allocation is, in practice, usually on the basis of a share of stream flow.
Rivers are divided into sections, and each withdrawal point receives a percentage of the water
in the respective section. Much of the work of water users organizations involves measuring
flows and allocating the water corresponding to each right.
A variation of the proportional system has been adopted in some localities in Australia
where share holders in storage projects use the concept of capacity sharing to reduce
uncertainty (Livingston, 1993). Water rights are defines as shares of reservoir storage space,
and its inflows and losses. Decisions as to reservoir releases are left to water rights holders
with balances being calculated continuously by deducting the amount of releases from storage
shares, adding shares of inflows, and deducting estimated evaporation and seepage losses
(Frederick, 1993). Water transfers are accomplished by simply making the appropriate debits
and credits. Where adequate storage is available, capacity sharing simplifies water transfers
and allows water users better control over the timing of water deliveries. "It is as if each user of
water, or group of users, has their own small reservoir on their own small stream to manage
independently from others" (Dudley, 1992).
Variations on these two basic methods for allocating water supplies can be found. One
example under the prior appropriation system is afforded by irrigation projects, mutual water
companies and other similar organizations which acquire water rights of various priorities and
then use a proportional method to allocate available water supplies among their members who
benefit from risk pooling. The water dividend to each user is not constant over time, but varies
according to the stock held by each user and the available water supply.
Another example of a mixed approach is afforded by the distinction between
permanent and contingent or eventual water rights in Chile. Permanent water rights are
allocated up to the average flow of a river and they have the first claim on available water.
Contingent rights are granted for surplus flow and they can be honoured only after all
permanent rights have been satisfied, so they are less secure. The allocation of water among
contingent rights holders is governed by a priority system according to the seniority of the
rights. Since the use of contingent water rights it typically limited to winter and spring, when
flows are higher and agricultural demand is low, they are mainly useful for water users who
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have sufficient storage capacity to capture water during periods of abundant water supplies
and preserve it until the summer growing season.
The manner in which allocation rules are defined may affect the efficiency of the water
rights systems, but deciding which approach encourages the most efficient allocation "depends
upon the specific characteristics of the water supply and users" (Eheart and Lyon, 1983).
Theoretically, if a costless short-term water market were possible, there would be little or no
difference between the systems and trades under either of them would tend to allow equivalent
ex post
 outcomes to be attained (Howe, Schurmeier and Shaw, 1986b; Eheart and Lyon,
1983). Real short-term markets do, however, involve transaction costs and there can be other
impediments to spot rights trades as well. As a result, in some cases, a priority rule may be
preferred; in others, a proportional rule may be more efficient.
A priority rights system appears to have efficiency advantages in areas of mixed water
use where water users are heterogeneous with regard to their demand functions and risk
avoidance, while a proportional system appears to be advantageous in uniform systems where
users' demand functions and risk avoidance are similar (Howe, Schurmeier and Shaw, 1986a
and 1986b). Under a priority system, risk-sensitive water users can acquire more senior rights
at higher prices, while those who are less sensitive to water shortages can acquire more junior
rights at lower prices. Thus, market transactions allow the transfer of senior water rights to
those economic activities which value reliable water supplies most. Water users can achieve
the desired level of security and still hold water rights equal to the average amount needed.
The inefficiencies that can arise during periods of shortage may be solved by short-term
exchanges of rights among water users holding rights of different priorities (Howe, Alexander
and Moses, 1982).
Under a proportional system, the fact that water users who need a reliable supply can
reduce the probability of shortage only by holding water rights in excess of average needs may
introduce some inefficiencies and encourage hoarding. Since during periods of normal supply
their rights yield in excess of their normal use, they usually lease this excess water to other
users on a seasonal basis. This phenomenon can be observed in Chile where many farmers
hold on to what may seem "surplus" rights to assure themselves of secure water supplies in
dry and drought years (Bauer, 1995b and 1997; Peña, 1997). In normal and wet years these
"surplus" rights are either unused, benefitting other water users downstream, or leased, but
they are usually not for sale. Since leasing is characterized by a higher risk of non-availability
and greater uncertainty and risk, the application of leased water is likely to be limited to
low-value uses (Howe, Schurmeier and Shaw, 1986a). The fact that this water is unlikely to be
made available during periods of shortage can preclude its application to those economic
activities which place the highest value on reliable water supplies. As a result, more water
could end up in short-term leases and, therefore in lower-value uses, than under a priority
system.
Another advantage claimed for a priority system is that, unlike a proportional system, it
provides tenure certainty for each water right holder by protecting them against loss of their
rights through the legal actions of others (Burness and Quirk, 1979). While under a
proportional system, the appearance of a new claimant to water reduces the tenure certainty of
existing water users, the seniority of the right protects the privileges of existing users under a
priority system. Apart from political and social pressures to allocate more water rights than
long-term historical flow can support, principal problems appear to be the lack of hydrological
data and the fact that many water rights that must be honoured today were granted many
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decades ago when understanding of the hydrological cycle and knowledge of the resource
were much less sophisticated than today. For this and other reasons the long-term average
yield of a water right under a non-priority system can be expected to be less than the maximum
flow rate or volumetric limit of a water right. Under a priority system, rights of senior
appropriates will be completely satisfied to the exclusion of junior appropriators.
A priority system of water allocation has, however, a major disadvantage stemming
from the heterogeneous nature of priority rights which can make it difficult to organize the
market and increase transaction costs. Under a proportional system, in contrast, the more
homogeneous nature of the rights, which are essentially interchangeable even though the
supply varies, facilitates market creation. This conclusion is confirmed by the experiences of
Chile, and of the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, "probably the best example of
a functioning water market" in the western United States (Cummings and Nercissiantz, 1992).
In addition, a proportional system of allocation allows low cost risk sharing among homogenous
water users. It is also operationally simpler and "more easily adaptable to formal market
procedures" (Eheart and Lyon, 1983).
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III. Transaction and transportation costs
The costs involved in the transfer of property, or transaction costs, and the costs of
transporting water, can significantly affect the capacity of any market to operate efficiently. If
water marketing is to achieve its full potential, markets must be designed to minimize these
costs. Water marketing may lead, however, to efficiency gains, even if transaction and
transportation costs are high. Moreover, increasing water scarcity raises gains from trade
relative to these costs. Transaction and transportation costs can be lowered by technological
advance and institutional investment and are also likely to fall somewhat as the level of trading
increases, as there are often strong learning-by-doing effects.
A. Transaction costs
Transaction costs are the resources dedicated to establish, operate, and enforce a market
system. They may take one of two forms, namely (i) the services which buyers or sellers must
provide from their own resources; and (ii) the differences (margins) between the buying price
and the selling price of a commodity, for example, due to the direct financial cost of brokerage
services (Stavins, 1995). Transaction costs are born not only by the trading parties, but also by
the public sector. These costs may be in whole or in part transferred back to trading parties
through fees and taxes levied on water rights transfers.
There are three potential sources of transaction costs in a system of tradable water
rights: (i) search and information costs, such as searching for trading partners, verifying
ownership of water rights and describing the right for purposes of the proposed transfer;
(ii) bargaining, contracting and decision costs, such as negotiating the price, arranging
financing and other terms of transfer, drawing up contracts, consulting with lawyers and other
experts, paying fees for brokerage, legal and insurance services, and transferring legal titles;
and (iii) policing, monitoring and enforcement costs, such as setting up a legal, regulatory
and institutional framework, mitigating possible third party effects, and ensuring compliance
with applicable laws.
In a water market, a considerable proportion of transaction costs can arise not from
the needs of the trading parties themselves, but from public policies governing water transfers.
The burden that policy-induced transaction costs impose on trading parties arise not only from
the direct costs associated with a transfer but also from time delays while waiting for regulatory
approval of a transfer proposal and the risk that the proposed trade will fall through (in this
case, trading parties lose the transaction costs they had expended in attempting to make the
trade). These opportunity costs can be high. For example in the western United States, the
delay from the time a transfer application is filed to the date of the state agency decision varies
from 4-6 months in New Mexico, to 5-9 months in Utah, and to astonishing 20-29 months in
Colorado (Colby, McGinnis and Rait, 1989; MacDonnell, 1990).
In Chile, the 1981 Water Code regulates the maximum time required for the resolution
of conflicts arising from the acquisition or exercise of water rights taken to the DGA: 30 days for
the public notice of a transfer to be published at the expense of the applicant, 30 days for third
parties to protest the application, 5 days to transmit the protest to the applicant, 15 days for the
applicant to reply to the protest, 30 days for the DGA to request additional information, 4
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months for the DGA to rule on the transfer, 30 days for the applicant and protestants to present
an appeal for reconsideration to the DGA which has 30 days to rule on it, and finally the
applicant and protestant have 30 days to appeal the DGA's decision to the Appellate Court
(appeals do not generally suspend the implementation of the DGA's resolution).
Most transaction costs found in water markets are present, of course, in one form or
another in other systems of water allocation. In addition, there are reasons to believe that the
transaction costs associated with water marketing will be lower that the administrative costs
associated with other allocative mechanisms because they are largely borne by the private
sector, which has greater incentives to control costs and because the market generates at
least some of the necessary information (Holden and Thobani, 1995; Ríos and Quiroz, 1995).
On the other hand, economies of scale could potentially reduce administrative costs in large
centralized systems.
Transaction costs prevent markets from operating efficiently and reduce the overall
economic benefits of water marketing both directly, by absorbing resources allocated to
transactions, and hence reduce the profitability of water transfers, affect the level of market
activity, and debilitate incentive properties of water marketing; and indirectly, by suppressing
transactions - and hence reducing total trading volume - that otherwise would have been
mutually and socially beneficial (Stavins, 1995). Transaction costs prevent the equalization of
marginal water values among different uses, users and locations. These price differentials
between and among uses, users and locations represent unrealized gains from trade, and
hence inefficient allocation. Because transaction costs add to the costs of a market transfer,
the potential benefits generally must be sufficiently large to justify the transaction costs
associated with the proposed transfer and the risk that the trade will fall through. In extreme
cases, transaction costs can prevent markets from forming altogether. The non-existence of
certain markets is often explained as a rational market response to transaction costs in excess
of potential gains from trade (Randall, 1983).
These considerations imply that transaction costs usually, but not always, reduce
welfare and that public policies reducing them are welfare improving in so far as they facilitate
wealth enhancing trade. On the other hand, some transaction costs arise from attempts to
protect third-party interests: "transaction costs do represent relevant interests, or at least
interests no less relevant than the typical non-transaction costs. Transaction costs represent
the protection of interests through rights as they become valued through the market …"
(Samuels, 1974). Policy-induced transaction costs are not necessarily wasteful or inefficient if
they provide protection for third parties who may be affected by water transfers (Colby, 1988).
To ensure that market transfers do indeed produce net social benefits, the externalities
associated with transfers should be taken into account. Since the buyer and the sellers cannot
be expected to do this voluntary, "government oversight of water transfers may be in the social
interest" (Frederick and Kneese, 1988). Such policy-induced transaction costs could, at least in
theory, enhance economic efficiency (Colby, 1990b).
Transaction costs may exhibit increasing, constant, or diminishing returns. Economies
of scale have been identified in policy-induced transaction costs in a number of regional water
markets in the western United States (Nunn, 1989; MacDonnell, 1990; Colby, McGinnis and
Rait, 1989). The economies of scale observed for relatively small transactions may not be
generalizable to larger transfers, particularly long distance geographic transfers between uses.
Very large transactions can generate attention and opposition that result in high transaction
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costs (Colby, Crandall and Bush, 1993). In addition, negative external impacts often increase,
sometimes non-proportionately, with the size and distance of water transfers.
Some components of transaction costs can be independent of the quantity transferred.
The title search, filing fees, and other similar costs often do not vary significantly with the
quantity of water being transferred. This penalizes smaller trades and favour larger trades.
Fixed transaction costs often result, therefore, in a bunching of transactions (Niehans, 1987).
Other transaction costs, such as, brokers' commissions, may be proportional to the amounts or
values traded and the effect is to reduce the quantity of goods traded (Crouter, 1987).
Diseconomies of scale are most unlikely, since parties can simply split their transactions into
smaller trades in order to reduce transaction costs.
Transaction costs tend to increase rapidly as exchanges increase in complexity and
the heterogeneity and specialization of the commodities being traded. Given that water rights
are multi-dimensioned goods and their value depends on many legal and hydrologic
characteristics, it is not surprising that most water marketing systems involve relatively simple
bilateral transactions, rather than complex multilateral contracts.
Transaction costs can affect the spacial concentration of market activity. Water trading
tends to be concentrated spatially in the areas where transaction costs are lowest. In Texas, for
example, the major market activity is concentrated in the Lower Rio Grande Valley where
transaction costs are low (Chang and Griffin, 1992). Transaction costs can also affect the
choice of the type of transaction. For example, if the transaction costs associated with a
permanent transfer exceed those of a lease, as they often do, then buyers and sellers will seek
to avoid the high transaction costs of permanent transfers and will prefer leasing to sales
(Crouter, 1987).
In the states of Colorado, New Mexico and Utah, transaction costs incurred by
applicants to satisfy state regulation averaged 6% of the prices paid for water rights (Colby,
McGinnis and Rait, 1989). A recent empirical study indicates that, in Chile, transaction costs
are particularly low in the areas with modern infrastructure and well-developed water users
associations (see Table 4).
1. Non-policy-induced transaction costs
The efficiency of competitive markets rests on the assumption that (i) either good, reliable and
easily accessible information is available on prices and other attributes of water commodities,
water availability, quality and costs of supply over time, the identity of buyers, sellers and
market intermediaries, and the procedures required to negotiate and complete a transaction; or
(ii) where there are efficient contingency markets to allocate risks associated with imperfect
information. In practice, such information is not always available, in part because producing
and dissimilating information has many features of public goods, and acquiring it is often costly
and difficult. In addition, markets to redistribute risk usually are incompletely developed due to
uncertainty about the nature of the risk and the asymmetry of information between market
participants (Saliba and Bush, 1987). On the whole, however, information requirements for
efficient water marketing are no greater than those needed for an effective administrative
allocation of water (Easter, 1994).
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Table 4
Transaction and transportation costs in water trading in Chile
Elqui Valley Limarí Valley
Buyers Sellers Buyers Sellers
Total transaction and transportation costs as a
percentage of transaction price
2 2 5 2
As a percentage of total transaction and transportation costs
• Costs of attorney's, notaries, and obtaining legal
inscription of rights
59 79 16 34
• Costs of engineering and modifying canal
infrastructure¹
20 3 64 62
• Opportunity cost of time invested 20 18 18 0
• Costs of gathering information on buyers and sellers 0 0 2 4
Source: Hearne and Easter (1995).
Note: The discrepancy in some totals is due to rounding.
¹ Estimated expenditures for engineering services, modification of gates and canals, and indemnities
for transferring water through canals. Includes expenditures up to the time of the study and does not
include planned expenditures for modifications needed in the future.
A study of water markets in the western United States concluded that all markets
studied were characterized by varying degrees of uncertainty and incomplete access to market
information on water commodities, prices and market opportunities (Saliba et al., 1987).
"Currently, access to information regarding the purchase of a water right is a cloak and dagger
operation. It is certainly not like buying stock on the New York Stock Exchange" (Tucker,
1995). Lack of accurate information increases uncertainty, affects the quantity and pattern of
water transfers, and hence the capacity of the market system to reallocate water efficiently and
the degree to which prices accurately represent values.
Where there is no ready means for buyers and sellers to obtain information, potential
markets participants face legal, hydrological, and economic uncertainties in the decision
making. Transaction costs, coupled with uncertainties as to the result of attempts to transfer
water rights, constitute a substantial disincentive to engage in water marketing. Transaction
costs are incurred in an effort to acquire accurate information, i.e., to reduce uncertainty and
create security. Their magnitude depends on the structure of the market and the frequency
with which water rights holders participate in the market and the nature of the commodity
traded.
The effects of transaction costs tend to be ameliorated in markets with relatively large
number of potential buyers and sellers which frequently participate in market transactions. In
active markets, the prevailing price is often a matter of common knowledge. As the pool of
potential trading partners increases, it should be easier for potential trading partners to identify
each other, thereby lowering transaction costs (Stavins, 1995). A larger number of market
participants can also mean more frequent transactions, generating more and better
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information, and thereby reducing uncertainty and transaction costs. Conversely, transaction
costs tend to be larger when there are few potential traders, or traders are highly disparate in
size. This observation suggests the inconvenience of public policies which artificially limit the
number of market participants and indicates a clear need to broaden access to property rights
in water to all interested parties, including investors, environmental interests, etc. The
frequency of transactions is also important: the higher the number of transactions in which a
buyer or seller participates, the better his or her knowledge of the requisite information
(Brajer et al., 1989). Unfortunately, the frequency of participation in water markets, as in
residential property markets, is likely to be relatively low. The institutional framework for water
marketing can be designed, however, to reduce transaction costs and to provide information
needed by potential traders.
There are several things public authorities can do to reduce non-policy-induced
transaction costs, including: (i) removing barriers to private intermediary or brokerage
services; (ii) establishing a clearinghouse or a computerized register to provide a
centralized location for water rights transaction or providing water rights banking and brokerage
services to facilitate trades between private parties (this might be especially useful in thin
markets, in the early stages of market development when potential market participants have
little experience with market transactions, and where water rights holders are poorly organized
and there is little communication among them); and (iii) facilitating access to a certain
amount of basic information
 regarding market activity, regulations governing water transfers,
the quantity and variability of the water supply over time, etc.
Private provision of intermediary services can play an important role where there are
search, information, bargaining and decision costs. Intermediaries can also play the role of
consultants, and assume risk by buying, selling, and holding water rights. Although
intermediaries are recipients of transaction costs, their activities are welfare improving because
they reduce transaction costs below what they would otherwise have been. Private provision of
intermediary services is likely to emerge in relatively large markets where economies of scale
permit the profitable operation of intermediary services and other institutions to facilitate
trading. In some areas, water markets can to be too thin to be profitable for intermediaries
specialized exclusively in water rights trades to emerge. As a result, already existing groups,
such as real estate brokers, attorneys, etc., are likely to assume these functions, as has
occurred in Chile. In Chile, offers to purchase water rights are advertised in newspapers and
water-user associations maintain information on prices in recent transactions (Rosegrant and
Binswanger, 1994).
Public authorities can facilitate market transfers and reduce transaction costs by
establishing institutions which act as a centralized clearinghouse for potential buyers and
sellers of water rights. These institutions can create and maintain a list of buyers and sellers
seeking to enter into water right transfers, leases, or exchanges; communicate bids and offers;
provide information and technical assistance to buyers and sellers; assist them in the
negotiation of contracts to buy, lease or sell water rights; and provide other intermediary
services.
This approach is widely used in the western United States where centralized
institutions of state or local governments are the predominant model for managing water
transfers (Water Facts Group, 1996). They perform the oversight, management, and control
functions needed to overcome the informational limitations of water markets and to deal with
external effects helping reduce policy-induced transaction costs. It is often complemented by
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water banking (e.g., in California, Idaho and Texas) and other similar programmes, some of
which involve sophisticated communications technology. The Westlands Water District, for
example, has recently established an electronic water exchange, which operates as an
electronic bulletin board where interested parties can post and read offers to buy or sell water,
access information on average prices and trading volumes, and even negotiate transactions
(Fikes, 1996; McLaughlin, 1996; Zachary, 1996). "Water banking implies some form of
organized water trading with a clearinghouse to facilitate transactions" (Frederick, 1993). Under
the water banking approach, water rights are traded through a government agency and prices,
timing, eligibility of water rights, priorities, and eligibility of recipients are often regulated.
Transactions are usually in the form of short-term leases. Transactions costs are reduced by
standardizing the terms of transfers and streamlining contracting and negotiations. Such banks
can be structured in several ways from a minimum of serving as an information clearinghouse
for potential buyers and sellers to actually creating a market with the bank buying and selling
water (Western Governors' Association, 1996). Operating costs can be funded by a charge
levied on transactions. The implementation of water banking is often accompanied by
measures to reduce policy-induced transaction costs (e.g., waiving some regulatory restrictions
on transfers).
Transaction costs can also be reduced by raising the level at which trades are
negotiated from the level of individual water right holders to a higher level, such as water users
associations. Water user associations can provide the management component necessary to
implement water transfers and serve as sources of information for those water rights holders
wanting to engage in trading (Easter, 1994). Their records can provide information on water
rights ownership, recent transactions, and water supply, etc., while their offices can serve as
informal clearinghouses helping prospective trading parties locate one another.
2. Policy-induced transaction costs
Transfers of water rights can have both positive and negative effects on those who are not
party to the decision process or transfer negotiation. The existence of externalities raises the
possibility that a transfer may be beneficial to the buyer and seller, but inefficient from an
overall social perspective. To the extent that water transfers are associated with significant
externalities, market prices will deviate from the true opportunity cost of water, and hence will
neither convey accurate market signals, nor encourage efficient water use and transfer
decisions. Economic efficiency requires that all costs and benefits associated with use and
transfer decisions be accounted for. In the United States, this requirement in embodied in the
"no harm" or "no injury" rule "permitting those who are not parties to a transaction to object on
the grounds that their rights may be harmed" (Getches, 1988).
While externalities can emerge under any allocation system, they pose a particular
problem for water markets, when water use and transfer decisions are decentralized to the
level of individual users. Since externalities arise at the boundary of decision units, the
decentralization of water use and transfer decisions implies the maximization of decision units,
and ipso facto the number of boundaries across which externalities might travel (Bromley,
1991). This fragmentation of decision points introduces greater complexity in the control of
externalities and "tends to increase the information, bargaining, and contracting costs of
agreement and therefore weaken the potential for negotiation to discover joint gains"
(Shabman and Cox, 1995).
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(a) Implications for water marketing
From the viewpoint of economic efficiency, water rights holders must face the full
opportunity costs of their actions, so external effects should be accounted for in transfer
decisions. If institutional arrangements do not cause buyers and sellers to account for external
effects of their decisions, a transfer may be beneficial to the trading parties, but actually
inefficient from an overall social perspective. Economic theory prescribes that the proper role
for governments is to intervene in a manner that will correct any external effects and restore or
substitute the requisite conditions for economic efficiency. There are several policy options
open to governments regarding externalities whether arising from water marketing or not, but
"even the most sophisticated market systems for water rights have yet to offer the complete
resolution of all third party effects" (Simpson, 1994a).
Firstly, a government might decide to ignore externalities and do nothing leaving the
problem to voluntary resolution. Even though this approach implies that society will sustain a
welfare loss, there may be cases where this approach is worth taking, particularly where
externalities are small both absolutely and in relation to the costs of regulation. This will be the
case with many local transfers. Externalities are usually ignored in informal water markets
which exist in a number of countries.
If externalities are small, they can be ignored with little ill effects for third parties.
Ignoring large externalities "introduces a potential for misallocation due to lack of information
and poor structuring of incentives" (Nunn and Ingram, 1988). Failure to internalize externalities
can accentuate distributional or equity problems. The nature of the externality is also important.
In the western United States, for example, the laws and institutions governing water transfers
provide protection to third parties from many but not all negative externalities of such transfers
(Howe, Lazo and Weber, 1990). Some parties who may experience significant externalities are
specifically excluded from filing protests and from influencing the conditions of transfer
approval (Colby, 1995). In general, only water rights holders can force their interests to be
accounted for, while other impacts are addressed in only a few states (Colby, 1995 and
1990b).
Secondly, a government might decide to forbid water transfers in the presence of any
externality due to "the difficulties of identifying and compensating adversely affected third
parties" (Young, 1986). This approach is based on the implicit assumption that all externalities
or their regulation are infinitely costly. Forbidding water transfers in the presence of externalities
is grossly inefficient because water supplies remain locked into suboptimal use patters and
many beneficial transfers do not take place, so efficiency losses can be substantial.
45
Thirdly, a government might decide to try internalize externalities by levying taxes on
those creating negative externalities and paying subsidies to those creating positive
externalities. This approach is increasingly used in many areas of water resources
management, for example, water pollution control, but not for the externalities associated with
water rights transfers. The use of taxes is sometimes advocated, however, for area-of-origin
effects. The major difficulty is obtaining information (Laffont, 1987). To determine the optimal
rate for such a tax or subsidy, regulators would require complete centralized information on all
parties' marginal costs and benefits, which is dispersed among affected parties and cannot be
efficiently acquired by regulatory agencies (Colby, 1990b and 1995).
Fourthly, since the ultimate cause of externalities "can conceptually be traced to a
lack of definition of property rights" (Boadway and Wildasin, 1984), a government may decide
to solve the problem of externalities in water transfers by clearly specifying property rights and
enforcing them, and establishing an institutional structure for negotiations among rights
holders. This approach is difficult to apply and is almost never used for most externalities
involved in transferring water rights because property rights for other attributes of water, such
as quality, are even more difficult to specify, enforce and make exclusive than for water
quantity. In addition, transaction costs would be prohibitive since, because of inseparabilities in
most uses, most transactions would involve two or more types of rights simultaneously. The
use of this approach is sometimes advocated, however, for return flow effects.
Finally, a government might decide, as most countries with formal water markets
have done, to address the problem through administrative or judicial means (see Figure 1).
Water users organizations, regulatory authorities and the judicial system typically review water
transfers in administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial hearings. Water user organizations or public
authorities are typically the first arbiter; if the solution is not satisfactory to either party, the case
may be brought to the courts or even require a political solution. These procedures can involve
substantial policy-induced transaction costs and are a significant factor in determining whether
a potential transfer can be implemented or not. The central question for regulatory policy is
what institution should be used to collect and process information on and account for
externalities associated with water transfers (see Table 5).
Regulations which force consideration of externalities that otherwise would not be
accounted for in private negotiations between buyers and sellers, impose transaction costs on
market participants in the form of transfer approval requirements (Colby, 1988). Therefore,
appropriately structured policy-induced transaction costs are not a net waste of resources, but
may facilitate efficient water transfers by giving traders an incentive to account for social costs
of transfers (Colby, 1990b and 1995). High policy-induced transaction costs are not necessarily
bad, rather they "reflect the substantial and multiple economic benefits associated with water in
various uses, benefits which can be impaired by a transfer" (Colby, 1990b).
(b) Implications for regulatory policy
While economic efficiency requires that all externalities be accounted for in market
decisions, regulations designed to protect third parties are a major component of transaction
costs and these costs may be large enough to prevent water from moving to
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Figure 1
The regulation of water rights transfers in the western United States
Transfer applicant submits application
to state water agency.
Application reviewed by state agency; modifications,
supporting documents and technical studies are
requested and submitted.
Public notice requirements satisfied.






State agency rules on application
approving, modifying, or denying it.
Ruling appealed. No appeal.
Judicial review.
Decision finalized
In the western United States, in
general, water rights are transferred
by a deed of conveyance with the
same formalities as in real estate
transfers. In order for a transfer to
occur, the water rights must have
been beneficially used and must
continue to be beneficially used
following the transfer. A water right
holder must obtain a prior
administrative approval, although in
some cases, prior judicial approval
or prior approval by the legislature is
required. In most states the burden
of proof that no harm will result is on
the transfer proponent. Different
types of externalities are accorded
different degrees of protection with
particular attention being paid to
effects on return flows. Other
external impacts are considered in
only a few states. In general, the
transfer must be in the public
interest, and in many jurisdictions,
the local public interests of the area
of origin must be considered. The
relevant considerations may include
environmental, economic and social
effects of the transfer. The party
seeking to transfer a water right
must file an application with the
state water agency, specifying the
desired modification. All states
require public notice of the intent to
transfer to inform parties whose
rights may be adversely affected by
the transfer so that they may
contest the application. State water
laws specify both who can legally
file a protest with the state and the
reasons for which a protest may be
filed. When a transfer is protested
on valid grounds, transfer approval
is delayed as the applicant and
protestants discuss the magnitude
of adverse impacts and the nature
and extent of mitigation or
compensation. State water
agencies encourage private conflict
resolution. If the parties fail to reach
a negotiated solution, the state
water agency will hold hearings and
rule on the transfer application.
Parties dissatisfied with the decision
may appeal to the legal system.
Source: Colby (1995) and (1990b), Getches (1990), and Anderson, Maddox and Simmons (1991).
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Table 5
Regulating transfers: how different institutions collect and process




Markets efficiently generate information on
direct costs and benefits, but ignore indirect
costs and benefits.
Transaction costs are low because indirect
effects are ignored. The transfer may be
beneficial to the trading parties, even though it




There are incentives to generate and present
information on external effects, but the
response to it depends on the political
dynamics of the district. A property-weighted
electoral system is likely to be biased against
external effects, while a one-person/one-vote
system is likely to be biased towards dispersed
effects.
There are incentives to exploit the transaction's
flexibility while adapting terms of transfer to
local concerns. Such districts may often
become the tool of a small group of members,
pursuing narrow goals with low levels of
membership participation. The decision making
process is biased toward interests which
identify with the purpose which motivates the




The biases of administrative agencies depend
on their missions, the disciplinary background
and expertise of personnel, and the kind of
analysis required by the regulations under
which they operate. If these regulations dictate
a consideration of external effects, they will be
formally considered, but the extent to which
they will actually be incorporated in the decision
making process depends on the political setting
within which the agency operates.
Administrative agencies are heavily biased in
favour of information that supports their
missions. Historically, administrative agencies
have not been especially sensitive to external
effects. These biases can be modified to some
degree through the rules for specific actions,
particularly if reinforced by an oversight body
representing protected interests.
The courts Courts are concerned with the protection of
legally established interests rather than with
maximizing net social benefits. In their decision
making, courts do not generally weigh the
magnitudes of direct and indirect effects. A rule
of law defining certain legally protected interests
often develops before some class of affected
parties has identified itself. Such rules are
difficult to modify without injury to established
interests and courts are usually reluctant to
change them.
In the evolution of judicial doctrine, courts
consider the public welfare effects of the rule
that is being adopted. Judicial doctrine evolves
towards recognition of previously unprotected
concerns, subject to the constraint that
previously protected interests should not be
unreasonably damaged. The courts are unlikely
to be especially sensitive to externalities
because the standing to sue and justiciable
rights of third parties are not well established.
Legislatures There are incentives for interest parties to
generate information about externalities and to
seek arrangements and compromises to
minimize them. Legislatures may be reluctant to
protect the newly discovered interests because
of their sensitivity to concentration of
established interests.
There is no general bias against indirect costs
and benefits. There is a bias in favour of
impacts that are immediate and concentrated
on special interest groups, but widely dispersed
costs and benefits are not well considered.
Legislatures often systematically distort
information on direct costs and benefits.
Source: adapted from Nunn and Ingram (1988).
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higher-value uses. The procedures for market transfers can sometimes be so restrictive, and
hence policy-induced transaction costs can be so high, that the benefits the marketing
approach offers are more imaginary than real. "The main issue in making markets work more
efficiently is to identify and quantify these effects accurately and quickly and to get agreement
on their magnitudes so that compensation and/or adjustments to the original property rights
can be carried out without excessive transaction costs" (Howe, Schurmeier and Shaw, 1986b).
The challenge is to develop institutions that provide protection from negative externalities
without imposing high policy-induced transaction costs. Public policies should seek to balance
the transaction costs necessary to insure the consideration of externalities that would otherwise
be ignored by transfer proponents in unregulated markets with the goal of facilitating transfers
for which social benefits exceed social costs. There are several things public authorities can do
to ensure that policy-induced transaction costs are neither excessive nor insufficient to achieve
their intended effect.
Public policies should seek to avoid excessive regulation. Since regulation of water
transfers imposes direct and indirect costs on water users as well as on the rest of the
economy, these costs must be carefully weighed against the objectives that regulation seeks to
accomplish. It is equally important to avoid adopting laws and policies that create uncertainty
regarding the conditions under which a transfer may or may not proceed or regarding how
much water can be transferred and for what purposes (Colby, 1988 and 1990a). The
uncertainty over the rules governing a market may prompt market participants to overinvest in
transaction costs and is likely to discourage expanded market trading by reducing incentives
for market transfers. Policy-induced transaction costs can often be substantially reduced by
establishing a clearly defined set of transfer rules and incorporating into them adequate
measures for third party protection, so that market transactions can take place at the behest of
trading parties contingent upon compliance with this set of trading rules.
The attributes of water considered deserving protection should be clearly defined and
incorporated into water marketing policies, and procedures developed to identify, value and
protect these attributes. The laws and institutions governing water transfers should be
designed to generate adequate information on the externalities associated with water transfers
and facilitate monitoring and enforcement in a least-cost manner; and to ensure that all parties
have the means to comply with their requirements, given the will to do so. Reliable hydrological
information is essential to determine who would be affected by a transfer and the magnitude of
injury.
Public policies should seek to provide both an efficient forum for negotiation and
access to coherent and reliable information. Administrative procedures which initially bring all
the parties concerned together informally to negotiate compromises and compensation reduce
policy-induced transaction costs, while those procedures which require a formal hearing and
presentation of evidence increase them (Colby, 1988). The judicial system should not be the
first forum for evaluating a transfer proposal, but should generally be the last and final forum for
conflict resolution. Access to reliable information is also important as "in the presence of
information deficiencies, players will tend to bargain from worst-case assumptions about
adverse impacts on their welfare. If this is the case, negotiated solutions are limited because
the compensation demanded from other parties may be increased unrealistically" (Shabman
and Cox, 1995).
Water marketing leaves more decisions to private bargaining and hence puts a greater
burden on the judicial system to coordinate the various interactions among different resource
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uses and users, and ultimately, to resolve conflicts when private bargaining fails to reach a
negotiated solution (Bauer, 1995a and 1996). Water markets need an active and
non-formalistic judicial system which is capable of resolving private conflicts through simple,
fast and low-cost procedures with predictable and consistent results.
An efficient administrative process is needed to monitor, enforce and record transfers.
The existence of many unregistered and not clearly defined water rights introduces uncertainty
into the water allocation system, increases transaction costs, impedes efficient monitoring and
enforcement, and makes information difficult and costly to obtain.
B. Transportation costs and infrastructure requirements
The efficiency of competitive markets depends on water being relatively mobile. Adequate
infrastructure allows for broader access to water markets by water buyers and sellers, and
hence promotes competition and helps ameliorate the problem of market power. In India, for
example, substantial private investments in pipeline networks have made water markets more
competitive (Dinar, Rosegrant and Meinzen-Dick, 1997). Adequate infrastructure also permits
dealing more efficiently with externalities, as the experience of the Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District suggests (Howe and Goodman, 1995). Markets will operate less
efficiently and there would be fewer potential traders in instances where it is difficult or
expensive to move water from one user to another.
On the other hand, many transfers can be accomplished without elaborate
infrastructure. Empirical evidence from Chile where markets operating with relatively
unsophisticated technology produce substantial economic gains-from-trade, and experience of
geographically limited water markets in other countries, suggest that water marketing can be
beneficial even when the trading areas and the number of potential buyers and sellers are
relatively small. In addition, secure water rights and their transferability provide strong
incentives to water rights holders to invest in the development and maintenance of hydraulic
infrastructure. Since traders must bear all transportation costs, they are likely to be more
attentive to cost effectiveness in infrastructure design and scale, so as to minimize
transportation costs.
Transportation costs represent a financial burden to trading parties, both in terms of
the direct costs associated with a transfer and the opportunity costs of time delays while waiting
for infrastructure modification or construction, and hence reduce the profitability of water
transfers and the amount buyers are willing to pay for water rights, and affect the level of
market activity and the number of potential buyers and sellers. When transportation costs
exceed the potential gains from trade, the incentive to participate in the market is lost. This
means that transportation costs can suppress transactions that otherwise would have been
mutually and socially beneficial.
Transportation costs prevent market transfers from equating marginal water values
among locations resulting in persistent price differentials. If there are differentials in the
productivity of water in various uses and locations, it must be possible to move water to the use
and location in which its productivity is highest. If water right transfers do not involve high
transportation costs, there would be small price differentials associated with the original
location of a water right. Where the necessary infrastructure is lacking and transportation costs
are high, market prices will differ for water rights with similar characteristics that are located in
different locations. Thus, high conveyance costs increase price dispersion.
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Unless gains from trade are so large as to make investments in a new transportation
system worthwhile, a water right has little value to users outside the area within which it can be
moved at a reasonable cost. The costs of transporting water long distances out of its natural
channels is usually high relative to its value in most uses. Typically, only very large transfers
justify the cost of constructing new transportation systems. It is for this reason that in most
countries, there are no national or regional water grids, and virtually all water systems are
independent and not interconnected, except by shared natural water bodies which provide
natural conduits for water transfers along which regional water markets develop. Consequently,
water markets usually exist in the form of relatively independent regional markets defined by
river basins, rather than entire regions or nations (Livingston, 1993).
The gains-from-trade and the ability of any given market to ensure efficient use and
transfer of water depend on the size of the area within which the water may be transferred at a
reasonable cost and the number of sellers and buyers in that area. All else being equal, larger
trading areas and larger numbers of traders offer better opportunities for larger
gains-from-trade and for improved market operations due to the wider set of trading
opportunities made available. Regional water markets in the western United States show a
significant relationship between market prices and the size of geographic areas within which
the water rights may be transferred (Colby, Crandall and Bush, 1993; Saliba et al., 1987;
Gardner and Fullerton, 1968). The limits placed by physical geography and infrastructure have
been cited in a number of studies as one of the factors explaining the relative inactivity of the
Chilean water market (see Box 5) (Peña, 1997; Bauer, 1995b).
The availability of conveyance infrastructure is usually not a significant constraint for
trades between water users drawing water from the same water body and for trades among
neighbouring users within the same water distribution system. For transactions involving
interbasin transfers, transfers from downstream to upstream areas in steep basins, other
transfers requiring energy for lifting/pumping, and transfers within large water distribution
system with few control structures or limited canal capacities infrastructure becomes all
important.
Since it is usually not economically efficient to build canals and other hydraulic
structures and to use them only intermittently, the availability of conveyance infrastructure is
particularly important for short-term water transfers. Even where the necessary conveyance
infrastructure is in place, the high fixed costs of infrastructure modification to accommodate
water transfers can put short-term and small-scale transfers at a comparative disadvantage in
relation to permanent and large-scale transfers. In Chile, for example, intra-agricultural leasing
takes place only between farmers diverting water from the same or very near canals because
of the high costs of long-distance trades (Gazmuri and Rosegrant, 1994).
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Box 5
Limits placed by physical geography and infrastructure
on water market activity in Chile
In Chile, the narrow central valley, where most of the
country's irrigated land is located, is divided from
north to south into a series of fairly small, short and
steep river basins separated by hills, which make it
expensive to transfer water between neighbouring
basins, or from downstream to upstream areas within
the same river basin. Inadequate infrastructure for
storage, diversion and conveyance also acts as a
constraint on water transfers. As a result,
transportation costs are often high except for transfers
between neighbouring or nearby users on a shared
canal system.
Partly because the Andean snowpack provides
natural, short-term water storage, substituting for
artificial reservoirs, but also because of the high costs
involved, Chile has few medium to large reservoirs for
irrigation, and thus very little long-term storage
capacity. Most storage has been constructed for the
generation of hydroelectricity. Because of inadequate
storage capacity, most of the hydraulic infrastructure
has been designed, built and operated for diverting
water from unregulated rivers with highly variable
flows.
The water flow in most canal systems is
controlled by weirs, "bocatomas", diverting water
directly from the river's edge to the head of the canal.
In many systems these are temporary structures
which have to be rebuilt or repaired every year. This
allows some flexibility in water transfers but makes it
difficult to quantify the diverted flow. In the canal
systems which employ more permanent concrete
structures, problems arise because the works have
been built to divert specific proportions of the natural
flow and are often hard to convert to different
specifications.
Within canal systems distribution works are also
inflexible. Since many systems use "marcos
partidores" or flow dividers, designed to distribute
fixed proportions of changing flows, most water
transfers from one farmer to another require the
re-calibration and modification of all intervening flow
dividers to ensure that the water rights of other users
are unaffected. Except for minor transfers, any
changes are often prohibitively expensive. Any
modification is even more complicated for trades
outside the tertiary canal.
Some systems employ "compuertas" or
adjustable gates to divide the water flow allocated to
different users. "Compuertas" allow more flexibility for
water transfers and help reduce transportation costs,
because water flows can be modified without
modifying the infrastructure itself by simply lowering or
raising the corresponding gates. Operating and
monitoring costs are, however, higher than with less
flexible infrastructure, principally because more
flexible infrastructure requires more monitoring and
control of the users' behaviour.
The poor levels of construction or maintenance of
canal infrastructure impose limits on the precision with
which transfers can be made. In addition, canal
systems servicing many farms resulting from the
Agrarian Reform were originally built for large farms
and are usually poorly suited to deliver water to many
smaller ones. Finally, some water user organizations
lack adequate managerial capacity to operate and
maintain the irrigation works under their responsibility.
The observed levels of market activity are closely
related to infrastructure availability with water markets
being more dynamic and effective in areas with better
infrastructure and well-organized water users
associations. In contrast, market transactions are less
common in areas where there is no storage and
where large canal systems use fixed flow dividers.
Source: Bauer (1995b) and (1997), Hearne and Easter (1995), and Ríos and Quiroz (1995).
In areas characterized by high variability of precipitation and streamflow, the
development of storage facilities to capture water during periods of abundant water supplies
and preserve it until times of lower supplies and higher demand is the principal technical
response to the need to make water rights relatively secure. The availability of supplementary
groundwater supplies can perform a similar function.
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The lack of adequate measuring devices can discourage market transfers both
because potential buyers may be reluctant to engage in trading unless they know they will
receive all the water they pay for and because third parties, not being able to ascertain the
exact volume of transfers, may be concerned that their rights will be affected by unmonitored
transactions. Community participation through water user associations can often substitute for
technological solutions and reduce the costs of monitoring and enforcement (Easter and
Feder, 1996). Water user associations can monitor water use and enforce the distribution of
water at low cost and use peer pressure as an effective and low-cost enforcement mechanism.
The operation and maintenance of infrastructure is important as poor operation and
maintenance increases water losses, and hence transportation costs, and imposes limits on
the precision with which trades can be accomplished. The need to ensure adequate operation
and maintenance underlines the crucial role of water user organizations in water marketing and
the need to encourage private sector participation in water-related infrastructure expansion,
operation and maintenance.
Transportation costs include also the costs of infrastructure modification to
accommodate transfers. These costs are likely to be high because of the rigidity of most of
hydraulic infrastructure. The operation of existing conveyance and storage facilities is likely to
require significant changes to facilitate water transactions, as most systems have not been
designed with the needs of water marketing in mind (Israel and Lund, 1995).
The coordination of water transfers is important because transfers often involve
interlocking delivery network systems characterized by substantial interactions in the provision
of flows to individual users and in the accommodation of changes. In most networked
infrastructures, supply and demand are not separated, but closely interrelated (Barraqué,
1993). It is essential to maintain equilibrium between supply and demand continuously and
throughout the network. The efficient and reliable supply will not be achieved without a
coordination mechanism regarding technical operation, connection procedures, transmission
protocols, etc. Such coordination can be handled either through a decentralized system of
contractual relationships or a centralizing coordination mechanism.
The former approach may prove difficult to implement in practice where there are
many small water users and where the costs of organization are high, as may be the case in
the areas with no tradition of collective action. For example, a study of irrigation in Pakistan
found that the coordination of turns in the water market is a difficult task when a system is
abused by the powerful farmers (Mirza, Freeman and Eckert, 1974; Renfro and Sparling,
1986). In contrast, in Chile, user participation has a long and successful history. Water users
organizations regulate and administer the water resources and related infrastructure under
their respective jurisdictions and own most irrigation and drainage works, including dams and
reservoirs. A centralized approach is probably necessary when there is very elaborate network
infrastructure capable of transferring water over large distances, as demonstrated by the
experience of the drought water banks in California. Whichever approach is adopted, "water
systems need to have a certain level of management capabilities to execute the desired
trades" (Easter and Feder, 1996).
Where market forces do not produce an optimal level of storage, conveyance and
distribution infrastructure, some form of government regulation or direct participation in the
financing, operation or management of these infrastructure elements may be justified. A study
by Shah and Zilberman (1995) suggests that, "high costs of monitoring and conveyance are
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likely to be an additional important factor in preventing the move to water markets", and that "in
some cases, government subsidization of monitoring and conveyance as well as availability of
information (extension) costs could be justified on grounds of improving social welfare". A study
of gains-from-trade in the water markets operating in Chile, showed that public investments in
water storage and delivery systems have the external benefit of reducing the transportation and
transaction costs involved in market transactions (Hearne and Easter, 1995).
Government participation may also be useful where the areas over which extensive
conveyance facilities are to be constructed are private properties. The acquisition of the
necessary areas is likely to be considerably cheaper and easier when undertaken by a
government because: (i) the piecemeal negotiation by private parties entails high transaction
costs and potential delays; and (ii) governments enjoy "eminent domain" privileges to override
private property rights (Easter and Feder, 1996). On the other hand, most conflicts over
rights-of-way can be resolved by voluntary private bargaining, provided that there are clear
rules about how these rights can be exercised and conflicts resoled.
Where water transfers involve the use of publicly owned water facilities, it is important
to ensure that their administration collaborates with private water rights holders and facilitates
water transfers initiated by private parties by proving access on a fair basis to its unused
facilities or capacities to transport or store water. There regulations should incorporate
appropriate safeguards for agencies that control facilities. Another option is to encourage
private sector participation in the management and operation of hydraulic infrastructure.
In California, for example, the "Model Water Transfer Act for California" provides that a
water user who transfers water or who receives transferred water may use up to 70% of the
unused capacity of water supply systems, including diversion, storage, transportation,
treatment, distribution, and related facilities, owned and operated by public agencies to
transport the water (Gray, 1996). Under this proposal, the agency may impose reasonable
terms and conditions on the use of its water supply system to comply with applicable water
quality and environmental standards, and has authority to charge the water user for the costs
attributable to his or her use of the system less the value of any benefits to its water supply
system that result from the transfer.
The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California has adopted two guiding
principles to analyze potential wheeling agreements and to fix wheeling charges (Metropolitan
Water District, 1996, 1997a and 1997b). The principle of "equal treatment" of water purchased
by its member agencies, whether purchased from it or wheeled from elsewhere, ensures that
the distribution and storage system's unused capacity is available to all members on an equal
basis. The "no harm" principle ensures that member agencies not participating in a wheeling
agreement are protected from wheeling agreements that would negatively impact them with
regard to water cost, quality or reliability.
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IV. The regulation of external effects
of water transfers
Externalities are pervasive in water resources management and in water transfers. It is useful
to distinguish two broad groups of externalities which can be associated with water transfers:
(i) physical or "return flow" effects, such as changes in downstream flows with surface
water transfers, and changes in the water table with groundwater transfers; and (ii) instream
flow effects, such as changes in fish and wildlife habitat, or recreation opportunities stemming
from changes in streamflow, in water quality, or in the seasonality of streamflow. There are
also the so-called "area-of-origin effects", such as effects on local communities, but these are
usually ignored in economic efficiency analysis because they represent income redistribution
rather than real welfare changes.
A. Return flow effects
Return flows occur because normally only part of the water withdrawn from a stream is
consumed. The water that is not consumed will return at some point to the stream, either
directly, by surface return flow, or indirectly, through groundwater, and consequently become
subject to downstream appropriation. Whenever return flows are used by water users
downstream, any change in the point of diversion or point of return, in the place of use or place
of storage, in the purpose of use, or in the time of use which alters the established pattern of
return flows can damage some users and benefit others (see Figure 2). In addition, since
surface and groundwater commonly belong to a hydrogeologically integrated system, surface
water rights transfers can affect the rights of groundwater users, and vice versa. Return flow
effects can be significant, but there is often a time lag before they become noticeable, and it is
often difficult to determine whether they are the result of the stochastic nature of river flows or
an upstream transfer, and to identify the transfer in question.
It can be argued that return flow effects should be "properly viewed as a government,
or legal, or analytical failure" because, it is possible, in principle, to define and allocate water
rights in such a way that the rights of downstream users do not rely on return flows (Paterson,
1989). This failure can be attributed to the crude understanding of stream hydrology at the time
of initial allocation and the possible physical and economic infeasibility of measuring return
flows (Huffaker, Whittlesey and Wandschneider, 1993), but also to the need to promote more
complete utilization of water resources. The problem can be avoided either by defining water
rights as consumptive entitlements and not granting rights to return flows, as provided for in the
Chilean 1981 Water Code, or by defining entitlements at the source and partitioning run-off,
storage capacity, and evaporation and seepage losses. While this may be feasible in some
circumstances, such as development of new water supplies under conditions of complete
information about the water resources on which the rights are based, it can lead to difficulties
where there are already formal and informal water rights based on return flows.
The importance of return flow externalities is likely to decrease over time as water use
becomes concentrated in urban areas where wastewater disposal is effected through a central
sewerage system (Howe, Schurmeier and Shaw, 1986a).
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1. Implications for water marketing
Where water is scarce enough to be the object of market transactions, "there are also likely to
be parties making use of the would-be seller's return flows" (Miller, 1987). The introduction of
water marketing may require greater attention to the problem because of the need to clarify
rights, more intensive water reallocation, and because the transferability of water rights
provides strong incentives for water users to use water more efficiently and to invest in water
conservation, thereby reducing return flows (Ríos and Quiroz, 1995).
Figure 2
Water transfers and return flow effects
Initial condition User C sells 250 units to user A
1 000 1 000
← 500 ← ← 750 ←
A R A R
↓ → 400 → ↓ < 400
↓ i B ↓ i B
↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
→ 300 → v ↓ → 450 → v ↓
← 300 ← ← ← ←
← 500 ← e ← 250 ← e
C C
↓ r ↓ r
→ 100 → → 50 →
300
Source: Griffin and Boadu (1992).
Return flow effects are a possible source of inefficiency in any transferable water rights
system, because a failure to take these external effects into account may generate inefficient
transfers in which social costs exceed social benefits (Howe, Schurmeier and Shaw, 1986a). In
informal water markets, for example, there is no compensation for the return flow effects and
this has resulted in sales by upstream users which decrease water availability to downstream
users (Thobani, 1997). This potential for inefficiency implies that public policies that seek to
protect third parties from return flow effects are desirable and can be justified on efficiency
grounds because they: (i) ensure that only those transfers which result in a net economic gain
to society as a whole are permitted, (ii) protect the interests of those under-represented in the
market process, and (iii) provide security to water rights based on return flows, and hence
promote more complete utilization of water resources.
On the other hand, these policies often are a major component of transaction costs
and may impede socially desirable transfers and introduce inflexibility in water reallocation by
unduly increasing the policy-induced transaction costs associated with them. In the western
United States, for example, protection against return flow effects is a primary source of
policy-induced transaction costs in most states (Saliba and Bush, 1987; Williams, 1983). In
addition, the need to protect third party water rights holders relying on return flows and "the
economic infeasibility of establishing elaborate conveyance systems between streams" can
limit the geographical scope of water rights transfers resulting in thin water markets (Saleth,
Braden and Eheart, 1991). Trade-offs exist between the benefits of protecting third party water
Under the original patter





the average flow. When
user C transfers rights to
A, there is no longer,
however, sufficient flow
to permit user B’s
diversion.
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rights holders from return flow effects, the costs of formulating and implementing these
policies, and the need to promote water rights transferability. These pervasive trade-offs
underline the need to carefully weigh the costs of the policies to protect the rights of third party
water rights holders against the benefits they are expected to generate.
2. Regulation of return flow effects
The policy options open to governments to regulate return flow effects include: (i) limiting
trades to the consumptively utilized portion of a water right; (ii) establishing cooperative or other
pooling arrangements within a given area; and (iii) establishing property rights over return flows
(see Table 6). Whatever option is adopted, the regulation of return flow effects can be very
complex and requires reliable and timely hydrologic and hydrogeologic data. The availability of
such data requires considerable investment in facilities to create comprehensive monitoring
and information systems.
In the western United States, return flows are often protected by restricting the
quantity of water that may be transferred to correspond to historic consumptive use rather than
the historic quantity diverted and requiring that the transfer should not harm other water users
(Saliba and Bush, 1987; Wahl, 1989; Griffin and Boadu, 1992). Determination of historical use
may be based by actual records, if they exist, but they are rarely adequate; expert testimony,
which is costly; or evidence (e.g., soil conditions, crop water requirements) of the amount of
water that would have been required for the purpose to which it was devoted, which is difficult
to obtain (Getches, 1990). This method can impose high transaction costs on market
participants and some jurisdictions use standard conversion rates to streamline the transfer
approval process. For example, in New Mexico, the state administrative agency sets a
standard quantity of water that may be transferred per unit of irrigated land, and parties who
disagree with this quantity bear the costs of demonstrating that some other amount is
appropriate, resulting in low policy-induced transaction costs (Colby, 1995, 1990b and 1988).
Some jurisdictions in the United States have adopted an alternative approach under
which water rights holders in a given geographic area or river basin surrender their individual
water rights to a centralized water purveyor, such as an irrigation district or a mutual water
company, in exchange for shares entitling them to a specified quantity of water (Gould, 1989).
Water rights can then be transferred freely within the entire service area by the transfer of
shares and return flow effects are ignored. A variation of this approach is used in the Northern
Colorado Water Conservancy District for the allocation of water from the Colorado-Big
Thompson project (Howe, Schurmeier and Shaw, 1986a). The Federal Government retains
ownership of all return flows from the Project and these return flows are reserved for recapture
and use by the District. As a result, water rights can be transferred without considering return
flow effects. Downstream users benefit from return flows of upstream water users but they
have no legal rights to them and if upstream users sell their water rights, return flows can be
lost. The arrangement does not mean that there are no real impacts on downstream parties
who rely on return flows, rather it relieves trading parties from liability for them. This
arrangement coupled with the homogeneous nature of water rights, a high degree of hydraulic
control achieved by the canal and reservoir system and an efficient administrative system
drastically reduce transaction costs and facilitate market transactions. As a result, a very active
and extremely sophisticated water market has evolved in the District.
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Table 6
Regulation of return flow effects
Limiting trades to the
consumptively utilized





Mechanism Water available for transfer is
restricted to historic
consumptive use and any
water irretrievably lost to
further beneficial use.
Users surrender their individual
rights in exchange for shares
entitling them to a specified
quantity of water. These can
be transferred freely only in a
given area and return flow
effects are ignored.
Water rights holders have full
property interest in the return
flows from their initial use.
Advantages Internalizes most return flow
externalities. Protects the
rights of all users to continue
using water in the same
manner as before. Promotes
complete utilization of water
resources.
Drastically reduces transaction
costs and facilitates market
transfers.
Internalizes both negative and
positive return flow effects and
creates incentives for water
rights holders to modify their
water use practices so as to
maximize the benefits of both
consumptive use and return
flows. Transaction costs
associated with third party
protection are likely to be
reduced.
Disadvantages High transaction costs. The
quantification of the
transferable portion of a water





positive return flow effects.
Market activity is limited to
trading consumptive
entitlements.
Return flow effects remain a
problem and a possible source
of inefficiency in water
transfers. Reducing the size of
the market, reduces the
opportunities for and potential
benefits of market
transactions.
Measuring the water returned
is difficult and costly.
Transactions are likely to
become more complex and
related components of
transaction costs are likely to
increase. This approach can
lead to difficulties where there
are already many formal and
informal water rights based on
return flows.
Comments Possibly attractive where
return flows are significant and
where the rights of many users
depend on return flows. Costs
of determining rates of
consumption can be reduced
by adopting standard rates, but
these can lead to errors.
Possibly attractive where the
value of water is low, return
flows are small, rivers are
short, transfers are mostly
local, and in areas served by
large distribution systems
capable of ensuring a high
degree of hydraulic control.
Can be expected to expand as
return flows become more
valuable and as measuring
costs are reduced.
Source: on the basis of California Department of Water Resources (1993), Gould (1989), Griffin and Boadu
(1992), Howe, Schurmeier and Shaw (1986b), Saliba and Bush (1987), Scott and Coustalin (1995),
and Williams (1985).
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In Chile, the 1981 Water Code defines water rights as full diversion and consumption
rights, with no obligation to return water, and downstream users cannot have rights to return
flows generated upstream. In practice, due to inconsistencies in the historical measurement of
streamflows, rights almost certainly have been granted over return flows ("return flows are
common in Chilean rivers, and are a very important source of water for many water users"
(Ríos and Quiroz, 1995)). This creates a certain degree of insecurity over the property right and
empirical adjustments are often made by the water user associations if transfers result in a
reduction in return flows (Holden and Thobani, 1995; World Bank, 1994). The approach
provides only a partial solution to the problem of return flows because it does not ensure that
there are no real return flow impacts on downstream water rights holders, so there remains the
possibility of inefficient transfers. Additional measures to protect users relying on return flows
are used in those rivers with high return flows. These rivers are divided into sections and
transfers between sections are prohibited (Ríos and Quiroz, 1995). In reality, several factors
help reduce return flow effects. The most important of them is the use of proportional rights in
many rivers. This results in any reductions in water availability, whether caused by water right
transfers or not, being distributed among all users. The particular geographic characteristics of
Chile also help reduce the return flow problem. Rivers are relatively short, with relatively rapid
flows and consumptive water use is spatially concentrated in the middle and lower parts of the
river basins with most intersectoral transfers occurring from upstream, mainly farmers, to
downstream, mainly water utilities, users. On the whole, "the reduced return flows from water
sales have not yet had a significant impact on downstream water users" (Easter and Feder,
1996), although it might be too early to pass definitive judgement on this point because of the
limited number of transactions and because many transfers are from holders who do not use
their water rights (Peña, 1996).
Finally, return flows can be protected by giving each water rights holder a full property
interest in the return flows
 from his or her initial use, so that other water users may not use
return flows without owner's consent (Williams, 1985). In quantifying water rights, two separate
property rights in water would be established: a right to divert a fixed amount of water and a
right to consume a fixed quantity of water (Griffin and Boadu, 1992). These rights can be
traded independently or together, although because of inseparabilities in most uses, market
transactions would likely involve both types of rights simultaneously (Griffin and Hsu, 1993).
Extending water marketing to both types of water rights would offer significant benefits of
internalizing both positive and negative return flow externalities and creating appropriate
incentives for water rights holders to modify their practices of water use so as to maximize the
benefits of both consumptive use and return flows. The likely effects include better incentives
for water conservation and wastewater treatment, and hence less water consumption and,
probably, more return flows (Scott and Coustalin, 1995). This approach is likely to reduce
transaction costs associated with third party protection, although transactions are likely to
become more complex and related components of transaction costs might increase.
Transaction costs and the difficulties in measuring return flows aside, "economic efficiency in
water use would call for the upstream appropriator to pay for the amount he withdraws and to
be paid for the amount he returns" (Scott and Coustalin, 1995).
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B. Instream effects
Water does not have to be withdrawn from a water body to generate economic benefits.
Instream flows play an important role in such uses as, waste dilution and assimilation,
providing a habitat for fish and riparian wildlife, and recreation. The benefits of such uses can
be high in comparison with withdrawals (Colby, 1990a and 1990b; Daubert and Young, 1981;
Ward, 1987). Failure to account for these benefits in market transactions can result in
inefficient water transfer decisions.
1. The protection of instream interests in water markets
Public policies to deal with environmental externalities of water transfers can be either
administrative or regulatory, seeking to protect instream uses through regulation of water
transfers, or market-based, protecting instream uses through appropriation and acquisition of
water rights for flow maintenance.
Regulation usually involves: (i) the establishment, monitoring and enforcement of
ambient water quality and return flow quality standards; (ii) the reservation of minimum or
ecological instream flows and levels, to be maintained regardless of water demand in other
uses, and the withdrawal of specific water bodies from appropriation; (iii) land use controls,
such as development restrictions for sites of ecological importance, the creation of national
parks and other protected areas; and (iv) a transfer review process in which a regulatory
agency can reject or modify applications for appropriation or transfer of water rights if they
substantially affect protected instream uses. It is essential to ensure that the regulation of water
quality is integrated with water rights administration and management.
The regulatory approach has an important weaknesses in that it is intrinsically
inflexible, i.e., it stands “in the way of any compromise or trade between persons for whom
levels for public uses have been provided and other persons, especially those holding water
flow rights for individual uses” (Scott and Coustalin, 1995). One of the potential benefits of
water marketing is that it provides a means for public and private interests to acquire water
rights for instream flows maintenance, and hence presents new opportunities for instream flow
protection and provides instream users with an attractive alternative to relying on the costly,
protracted, and often unpredictable political process and litigation. It should be noted, however,
that "realistically, one would not expect such behaviour to be especially prevalent" (Randall,
1981).
Since instream users do not divert water, they can enhance instream flows by
purchasing upstream diversion rights and selling them to parties downstream from the location
of their use, thereby achieving additional flow at intermediate points (Anderson and Leal, 1988).
Such sales would have to specify that the buyer cannot transfer water to parties upstream.
Obviously, this restriction would result in lower prices, "but that would be the price of preserving
instream flows" (Anderson and Leal, 1988). Once the rights are sold, however, instream uses
remain vulnerable to upstream transfers by other downstream water rights holders, because
instream users will not have any basis on which to protest later transfers that reduce the
instream flow that has been thus arranged (Livingston and Miller, 1986). The problem can be
solved by purchasing upstream diversion rights and leasing them to parties downstream,
because in this case, the water right remains with the instream user and can be protected
against damage from any transfer (Livingston and Miller, 1986). Option contracts are an
attractive alternative to purchases and leases, because they can protect instream flows during
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dry years but do not tie up supplies during years when streamflows are adequate (Colby,
1990a). Another interesting alternative is to establish and manage a system of economic
incentives to subsidize the reallocation of water rights to water users downstream and to tax
upstream transfers of water rights as a means of enhancing instream flows and accounting for
instream flow benefits (Griffin and Boadu, 1992).
In many western states of the United States, state agencies may acquire - through the
appropriation or reservation of unappropriated water, dedication by private entities, or outright
purchase - water rights to maintain instream flows (Saliba, 1987; Colby, 1990a and 1995).
Although this authority has seldom been exercised, water transfers for streamflow
maintenance are becoming more common. In acquiring these rights state agencies typically
consider requests from other parties, but private parties generally may not hold rights for
instream purposes (Livingston and Miller, 1986; Colby, 1995). Only a few states allow a private
party to hold a right for the purpose of maintaining instream flows (Saliba, 1987; Colby, 1988;
Colby, McGinnis and Rait, 1991).
Water markets in the western United States are undergoing important transformation.
While initial market activity centred on transfers from agriculture to urban drinking water supply
and industrial users, more recently, transfers have been initiated to enhance instream flow
values and to resolve conflicts over the appropriate allocation of water between environmental
instream and diversionary uses (Colby, McGinnis and Rait, 1991). Government purchases of
water rights for instream flow maintenance have been used to increase the flow of fully
appropriated streams where instream flows can be restored only by terminating the rights of
existing users. In such cases, "purchasing rather than condemning existing water rights may
be quicker and perhaps even less expensive when a voluntary transfer can avoid a lengthy
legal struggle" (Frederick, 1993).
Not only has the public sector become more active in acquiring water for instream
flows, but some private environmental groups have acquired rights for instream flow
maintenance in several states (Colby, 1988 and 1990a; Saliba, 1987). For example, the
Oregon Water Trust works to acquire water rights and commit those rights to instream flow
maintenance to conserve fisheries and aquatic habitat and to enhance the ecological health of
water courses (Bullitt Foundation, 1997). In general, its transactions are relatively small in
scale, and most are targeted to benefit small tributaries with critical fish populations or other
ecological values (Volkman, 1997).
On the whole, however, the role of market acquisitions in protecting stream flows has
been limited. The relatively low level of market activity for flow protection is attributed in part to
the fact that the transactions costs for this category of transfers are likely to be higher than for
water rights purchased for diversionary uses (Colby, 1990a). The principal reasons for this are:
offstream users usually oppose the acquisition of water rights for instream flow protection
(Livingston, 1985); the incorporation of instream uses in the transfer review process makes it
more complex and costly (Colby, McGinnis and Rait, 1991); and public agencies have little
experience in handling transfers from diversion to instream uses (Colby, 1990a). In addition,
instream users are interested in the level and duration of river flow, but a right to divert a given
flow for a given period does not easily translate into a right to a certain depth at a certain
location (Scott and Coustalin, 1995).
In addition, public and particularly private agencies potentially interested in acquiring
water rights for flow protection may be reluctant to do so because of the fears that "water
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transfers to the environment will not ... create increased water flows because pre-existing
streamflow requirements will absorb the transfers" (Gray, 1996). The "Model Water Transfer
Act for California", a business-sponsored proposal to facilitate and streamline water transfers in
the state, addresses this problem by requiring that water that is transferred to instream uses is
in addition to regulatory requirements governing water quality, instream flows, fish and wildlife,
recreation, and other instream beneficial uses and that regulatory agencies and courts must
exclude water transferred to instream uses from their determination of the amount of water
required to comply with these regulatory requirements. Another concern is the capacity to
monitor and enforce the rights to instream flows (Howe, 1988).
2. Principal issues
(a) The public goods aspects of instream flows
While off-stream water uses are typically for private goods production, there is often a
high degree of non-excludability and non-subtractability associated with many instream uses,
i.e., they are typically used for public and quasi-public goods production. Hydroelectricity
generation and water transport are the main exceptions. A high degree of non-excludability
both inflates demand for instream uses and constitutes an important impediment to private
provision, because beneficiaries cannot be readily be charged a fee.
The public goods nature of instream uses provides a theoretical justification for a
public role in the acquisition of water rights for streamflow protection. Government participation
can complement private sector efforts to protect flows at adequate levels and desirable
locations (Colby, 1990a). On this view, one of the best means of protecting instream flows
would be to extend the capability to appropriate or purchase rights for instream uses to
appropriate public bodies, especially local governments, as most of the benefits and losses
generated by stream systems are local in their impact (Howe and Lee, 1983; Howe,
Schurmeier and Shaw, 1986b; Howe, 1988 and 1996). For this reason, local governments
"have an incentive to identify streams deserving protection, to provide funds to protect flow
levels and to monitor and enforce flow standards"; they also have "a unique perspective on the
trade-offs between retaining water instream and making it available for offstream uses" (Colby,
1990a).
As rights holders, however, public agencies, including local governments, present a
number of problems. There is the risk that authorizing a public agency to use budgetary funds
to acquire water rights could result in excessive amounts of water being dedicated to instream
flows (Williams, 1985). In addition, there is the risk that such an agency, even well endowed
financially, may be unable to respond quickly to changing market conditions and may be not as
cognitive of the opportunity costs of holding onto its rights, as acutely as would a private entity
(Anderson and Johnson, 1986; Williams, 1985). On the other hand, there are obvious
economic limits to the public purchase of water rights, especially in the low-income areas; and
the nature of public agencies may prevent them, for example, because of the political power of
opposing interest groups, from acquiring the requisite number of rights (Livingston and Miller,
1986).
(b) Transfer externalities
The introduction of instream rights should not affect the rights of existing offstream
users to continue using water in the same manner and place as before (Thompson, 1982). It
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can reduce, however, the transferability of existing consumptive water rights from downstream
to upstream users, which may introduce a potential for opportunistic behaviour aimed at
extracting rents associated with upstream transfers (Anderson and Johnson, 1986). Transfer
externalities are site specific and depend both on the degree to which the water course is
appropriated, and the location of an instream water right in relation to diversion rights
(Livingston and Miller, 1986).
(c) The need for coordination
The nonconsumptive nature of instream uses does not eliminate conflicts among them
and between them and diversionary uses. Different instream and diversionary uses have
different requirements for different but interdependent physical, biological and chemical
attributes of streamflows which both vary in time and space, and are affected by water use and
transfers.
Perhaps the most common complication arises with uses which rely on reservoir
storage to allocate annual streamflow over time. For example, in many locations
hydroelectricity generation competes with other water uses because it shapes streamflows to
meet power demand that are often out of phase with the seasonal requirements for other uses
(Huffaker, Whittlesey and Wandschneider, 1993). The coordination between offstream uses
and instream recreational and environmental uses is also problematic because both compete
for limited water, but each of them is interested in different dimensions of the water resource:
offstream users care about diverted and consumed quantities, while instream users are
interested in the level and duration of river flow and lake levels (Naeser and Smith, 1995;
Griffin and Boadu, 1992).
In Chile, in order to overcome some of the difficulties involved in coordinating the
instream and withdrawal uses of water, specific consideration has long been given to instream
uses, culminating in the creation of "non-consumptive water rights" in the revisions to the water
law embodied in the 1981 Water Code (see Box 6).
C. Area-of-origin effects
"Area-of-origin" effects or the economic, social, cultural and environmental impacts of water
transfers on areas from which water is transferred. These effects have a particular implication
for water markets because they have the potential of affecting the conditions under which
transfers will be approved and the costs of implementing such transfers (Saliba and Bush,
1987). The most important of area-of-origin effects are the negative impacts on local
economies and interference with the operation of water distribution systems. There may also
be environmental effects, particularly if agricultural land goes out of use. A particular concern,




Consumptive and non-consumptive water rights in Chile
Under Chilean water law distinctions have always
been made between various types of rights. In the
revisions to the law embodied in the 1981 Water
Code, a particular distinction is made between
"consumptive rights", which entitle the holder to
consume the water without any obligation to replenish
it, and "non-consumptive rights", which entitle the
holder to use or divert waters provided they are later
returned to their original channel, without damaging
the rights of third parties to the same waters in any
way. The concept of non-consumptive rights was an
extension for any instream use of the lesser rights,
“mercedes de fuerza motriz”, granted for hydroelectric
power generation in earlier versions of the law.
While, as a general principle, the Water Code
does not recognize any order of priority among water
uses, it contains several provisions which maintain
the subordination of non-consumptive rights to
consumptive rights. Under it, owning a
non-consumptive right does not imply, except by
express agreement between the parties, any
restrictions on the free disposal of consumptive rights.
The Water Code also provides that non-consumptive
water rights holders cannot detain the flow of water
without permission from the consumptive rights
holders, must avoid sudden surges and reductions of
flow, and cannot prevent consumptive rights holders
from modifying their canals or closing them for
maintenance. The rules for exercising a
non-consumptive right are determined in its formal act
of acquisition or constitution.
The distinction between the two types of rights
has not prevented conflicts over management of
reservoir storage between power companies and
farmers. These conflicts have centred around the
interpretation of the provisions of the Water Code
about the definition of non-consumptive rights and
their relation to consumptive rights. Power companies
have argued that, in their view, non-consumptive
rights implicitly include the right to temporarily store
water in reservoirs and to some degree of flow
regulation, or it would defeat the whole purpose of
hydroelectric development. Farmers are
understandably concerned about the effects of
storage and flow regulation on their consumptive
rights. In some cases, farmers have found much of
their water cut off during the peak of the irrigation
season, while in other cases, the issue has been the
timing of releases and their effects on downstream
users. Farmers protest that the frequent,
unpredictable fluctuation in the flows reaching their
canals increase costs and make their water rights
less valuable.
The failure to integrate non-consumptive rights
holders into the user organizations, “juntas de
vigilancia", responsible for water allocation, and the
necessity to resort to judicial solutions have
exacerbated the conflict between consumptive and
non-consumptive users. The juntas decide on the
allocation of water, but decisions within these
organizations are made by majority vote and the
member canals cast votes in proportion to their water
rights. Since the law does not establish any
proportionality between the two types of rights and
there can be several non-consumptive water rights for
each consumptive right, the non-consumptive users
are likely to outnumber and outvote the consumptive
users. For this reason, consumptive users tend not to
invite non-consumptive ones to their meetings, in
consequence the latter for their part tend to ignore the
organizations. Thus, a useful forum for negotiation
and a low-cost and expedient conflict resolution
mechanism does not function effectively, and many
conflicts have to go to the legal system, whose
performance has been uneven.
Source: Bauer (1995b) and Figueroa del Río (1995).
1. Economic effects
The potential economic effects of water transfers are usually ignored in economic efficiency
analysis on the grounds that they constitute "pecuniary" externalities and as such represent
income redistribution rather than real welfare changes because: (i) any temporary unemployed
resources will be able to move quickly and without undue cost to other uses; and (ii) since
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transferring water to a higher-value use should generally result in an equally higher positive
pecuniary externalities, any negative effects in the area-of-origin will be more than offset by the
positive economic effects for the area-of-receipt. In addition, pecuniary externalities are hard to
measure and their measurement has been subject to great abuse in justifying various projects
(Howe and Goodman, 1995; McCarl et al., 1997).
In practice, negative economic effects of water transfers on the area-of-origin appear
to be small and can be often compensated by benefits in importing areas. For example, an
evaluation of the 1991 California Drought Water Bank estimates that the income gains in
agricultural regions that bought water were US$ 45 million, while losses in exporting areas,
were US$ 13 million (Howitt, 1994). Employment impacts were equally positive. In Chile, rural
to urban transfers have rarely resulted in negative effects in the exporting areas, because
farmers usually sell small portions of their water rights and are able to maintain agricultural
production by adopting more efficient on-farm irrigation technology (Rosegrant and Gazmuri,
1995).
Only in extreme cases are incompletely compensated effects likely to arise. The
magnitude of economic impacts can be expected to vary with the size, suddenness and
distance of the transfer, the characteristics of the area-of-origin and its economy, the use of the
water sales proceeds, and the strength of the backward and forward linkages between
agriculture and other local economic activities. For example, in Colorado, early transfers were
local in nature, to higher-value, more employment-intensive uses within the same economic
area (Howe, 1997b). They stimulated the local economy and the negative economic effects
associated with the transfers were relatively small. Later transfers were larger, most of them
interbasin, resulting in noticeably larger secondary regional impacts.
Real economic losses may occur in the presence of long-term, structural
unemployment of resources, immobility of resources, and the existence of economies of scale
in related economic sectors (Young and Haveman, 1985; Howe and Easter, 1971). Since rural
and urban transfers often take place from depressed areas characterized by long-term
unemployment of human and other mobile resources and there can be impediments to
resource mobility, "pecuniary externalities usually involve some real costs that should not be
ignored" (Howe, 1997b). In addition, income redistribution from rural exporting to urban
importing areas may be undesirable from a policy standpoint (Nunn and Ingram, 1988).
It is in part for these reasons that some jurisdictions in the United States have adopted
strong, perhaps excessive, policies to safeguard the needs of exporting communities. In
Colorado, for example, Water Conservancy Districts that export water from the basin of the
Colorado river and its tributaries are required to construct compensatory storage reservoirs in
the basin of origin (Anderson, Maddox and Simmons, 1991). "This requirement has proved to
be enormously wasteful and of little tangible benefit to the area of origin because most
completed compensatory storage projects have stood unused" (Getches, 1988). Several states
allow recapture of a share of the transferred water at a later date through a superseding priority
that can be used to meet future area-of-origin needs (Anderson, Maddox and Simmons, 1991).
Such restrictions discourages the out-of-basin transfers because of the uncertainty caused by
making the acquisition of rights subject to some future, unquantified right of recapture. In
Idaho, a statute provides that transfers from agricultural use should not be approved where
such changes would significantly affect the agricultural base of the local area. Some states
adopt a balancing approach of the benefits and detriments expected to result from a transfer
authorizing it only if its benefits outweigh detriments to the originating basin. In Nebraska, for
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example, interbasin transfers are deemed in the public interest if the overall benefits to the
state and the applicant's basin are greater than or equal to the adverse impacts to the state
and the basin of origin. In Montana, only the Department of Natural Resources and
Conservation may appropriate water for export out of specified river basins, and the state may
then lease such water for periods of up to 50 years.
Although these policies may seem excessive, some limited transitional assistance
during periods of economic and social change could be warranted to help labour and capital
move quickly and without undue hardship out of economic activities forced to contract by the
transfer (Howe, Lazo and Weber, 1990). In addition, setting aside the question of economic
efficiency, compensation to affected parties may be viewed as a practical policy tool that may
reduce local resistance, facilitate the process of implementation, and reduce the transaction
costs of implementing water transfers (McCarl et al., 1997). It is important to note, however,
that modern dynamic economies are characterized by intensive resource reallocation which is
the source of much of economic growth. Governments do not generally provide protection from
the indirect economic and social effects of resource reallocation decisions (Gould, 1989).
In considering any restrictions on water transfers, it is important to avoid protectionist
policies which lock water into historic uses or specific locations and perpetuate antiquated
water use patters that run contrary to efficient water allocation and modern demands, rather
then encourage reallocation as economic and social conditions change. This inertial
inefficiency is inconsistent with the notion of maximizing water contribution to aggregate welfare
and can result into substantial economic losses.
2. Effects on water distribution systems
Water transfers can cause disruption and expense in adjusting distribution schedules and
modifying diversion or distribution facilities (Clyde, 1989). Since all water rights used in the
system are hydrologically interconnected, a sale of water rights to outside parties can make the
other farmers bear a disproportionate share of the future seepage and conveyance losses and
reduce the return flow available to downstream users. Even if the volume of water available for
transfers out of the district system is defined on the basis of consumptive use, the reduction in
the amount of water flowing through a system could increase the cost of water delivered to
other farmers (Miller, 1987). This occurs, in part, because conveyance losses are not
proportional to the quantity of water conveyed and because irrigation systems are often
designed to facilitate the reuse of seepage from higher portions of the district's service area on
lower parcels within the system.
A related concern is that if many rights are transferred, it can become difficult to
finance system operation and maintenance costs (Easter, 1994). In the La Lagunera region of
Mexico, for example, some water users organizations have developed a scheme to partially
compensate the water user association losing the tariff income under which the buyer must pay
70% of the water tariff to the original association and 30% to the new association (Thobani,
1997).
Regulation of water transfers to outside parties should seek to balance the need to
avoid any unreasonable impairment of the rights of remaining farmers, on the one hand, and
the need to enable those who wish so to transfer their water rights to do so. These regulations
often take the form of requiring a prior consent of a district to transfer water to a location
outside its boundaries or other restrictions on individual water transfers. Miller (1987) has
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shown that "these restrictions may be consistent with efficient water use and transfers" in
cases where individually arranged transfers would impose negative externalities on other
members of the district. In the United States, for example, in addition to receiving state
approval, a transfer of water rights from a water district to lands outside the district boundary
generally must receive prior approval of the district, while in the case of a mutual water or ditch
company an approval by the board of directors may be required (Anderson, Maddox and
Simmons, 1991).
3. Cultural effects
An important question for policy-makers is whether to take a passive role in allowing
unrestrained water transfers from rural areas that have historically depended upon irrigated
agriculture or to regulate these transfers with the view to protect rural cultures and lifestyles. On
the whole, "it is completely legitimate for a society to protect cultural sub-groups through the
reservation of water supplies. This is particularly true for cultures that centre on water" (Howe,
1997b).
There are several policy options, for example, protection may be provided by
prohibiting permanent alienation of the water rights necessary for the preservation of important
cultural values, but not temporal transfers. This approach has been implicitly adopted in the
United States for the protection of reserved water rights accruing to Indian reservations of land.
Alternatively, local authorities can protect cultural and social values through local zoning and
land development regulations as to what type of development will be allowed or prohibited
within their jurisdiction. The main disadvantage of these approaches is they are likely to result
in the allocation that is rigid over time and unresponsive to changing economic and social
conditions. One promising possibility is to vest the water rights in the community, rather than in
individuals, letting the decision-making process at the community level to take cultural
externalities into account when deciding whether or not water should be sold (Howe, 1997b),
but this can lead to political concerns determining decisions rather than the operation of market
forces (Williams, 1983). This kind of approach has been taken in Chile to the question of the
water rights held by indigenous groups who do not accept individual ownership.
Although it is completely legitimate for a society to protect rural cultures and lifestyles,
it is important to remember that plentiful water supplies do not by any means guarantee the
achievement of these objectives. "Great care must be taken to avoid overselling the efficacy of
water as a tool for solving what are essentially social problems that are more likely to be
successfully dealt with by sustained and arduous collective efforts" (Young, 1986).
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V. Distortions and market imperfections
One of the fears that is expressed in most discussions of water markets involves the degree to
which water allocations maybe effected by the existence of market power, hoarding,
speculation, and few transactions ("thin" markets). The traditional response to these fears has
been the adoption of administrative restrictions, but the perverse incentives these provide have
led to the consideration of new regulatory instruments which rely more on economic incentives.
A. Market power, speculation, hoarding and “thin” markets
1. Market power in a water market
Market power may be exercised in a water market in two ways: (i) directly, either through
monopolistic behaviour as a price setting seller who sets price signals that are followed by
other market participants or through monopsonistic behaviour as a price setting buyer; or (ii)
indirectly where there is the potential for some economic agents to use control of water rights
to exercise market power in the output market for the product for which water is an input.
(a) Monopolistic and monopsonistic behaviour
In any market, there exists the potential for some economic agents to influence market
price levels or restrict transfers. Economic efficiency requires the presence in a market of a
sufficient number of buyers and sellers so that the quantity of a good bought by any one buyer
or sold by any one seller, relative to the total quantity traded, does not affect the market price.
Where economic power is dispersed, no single market participant is in a position to exploit its
market power to undermine competition and to gain unjustified advantage. As a result, buyers
or sellers take the prevailing market price as given, i.e., act as "price takers". Where individual
buying and selling decisions have a major impact on the price, prices may no longer reflect
marginal values and they may cease to provide the market signals necessary for efficient
resource allocation. Market power not only tends to reduce efficiency gains from market
transfers, but may also have undesirable effects on the distribution of income (Brajer et al.,
1989). A large share of transferable property rights, however, does not necessarily mean
having influence over the outcome in the market (Hahn, 1984).
In theory, but hardly in practice, large holders of water rights, often public utilities,
might attempt to manipulate prices to improve their positions in the water market and to obtain
"excess" profits. If there are few sellers, a seller with market power would follow a strategy
resembling that of a monopolist, selling off, in any given time period, less than the quantity of
water rights that would be sold in a competitive market, with the objective of forcing up the
price above the competitive level, and hence earn larger profits at the expense of society as a
whole. Such behaviour could stifle economic growth and create monopolistic profits for the
sellers. Obviously, subsequent reselling of water rights would reduce monopoly power
(Anderson and Johnson, 1986). In many cases, however, to execute monopoly power, it would
be necessary to actually withhold the water which is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
achieve given its fugitive nature and probable limits on storage capacity.
If there are few buyers, a buyer with market power could follow a strategy resembling
that of a monopsonist with the view to force down the price below the competitive level. In the
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water sector, some monopsonists could also be monopolists in the output market
(e.g., water-related public utilities). To counter the monopsonistic behaviour, sellers may decide
to limit the number of actors on the supply side by participating in water markets at the
wholesale level, for example, the irrigation district as a whole, rather than as individuals
(Gardner, 1990). In the United States, in some cases, in response to plans for a major water
purchase, farmers have negotiated jointly to ensure that all right holders had an equal
opportunity to sell, that all sellers would receive the same price, and that the buyers would
negotiate with interested farmers as a group so that collective interests could be considered
(Saliba, 1987).
Studies of the empirical impact of market power on the cost-effectiveness of
transferable discharge permit markets, which have a similar, if not more concentrated,
structure than water markets, "are consistent with a finding that market power does not seem
to have a large effect on regional control costs in most realistic situations ... Successful cartels
are difficult to establish and maintain for any commodity ..." (Tietenberg, 1995). Rosegrant and
Binswanger (1994) found that emerging water markets in developing countries are
characterized by a great deal of competition, rather than monopolistic power.
Reputation effects may also be an important restraint. For example, evidence from
water markets in the western United States suggests that high-visibility buyers of irrigation
water rights, such as public utilities and businesses which are dominant actors in the regional
economy, pay more per cubic meter for rights than other buyers (Colby, Crandall and Bush,
1993). The price premium may reflect various factors, but perhaps most important is the fact
that many high-profile buyers are concerned with protecting their reputation and that of their
shareholders' and may be inclined to pay somewhat higher prices for water rights to avoid the
costs of negative public perceptions and to mitigate the controversy that often accompanies
large agriculture-to-urban water transfers, both factors that could impose other costs on their
activities in the basin and attract attention of regulatory authorities.
The potential for the accumulation of market power is greater in basins where
unappropriated water exists along side rapid economic growth, especially if the original
allocation of rights is free of charge and without any requirement that the water be put to a
beneficial use (Howe, 1997b). In such systems, monopolization of supply can lead to
substantial inefficiencies. In contrast, in the river basins where water is fully appropriated and
there are many holders of rights (in Chile, for example, there are about 300 000 water rights
holders (Faine, 1996)) and active water markets, the danger that monopolies or monopsonies
will develop is relatively small (Howe, 1997b).
The possibility of monopolizing the market for water rights cannot be entirely ruled out,
but for the most part, there is little danger of any single user dominating any basin to a degree
that market competition is restricted. If market power posed a problem, however, the
appropriate response is the application of general competition and antitrust or anti-monopoly
policies. Restrictions on transfers, such as individual limits on ownership, may help prevent the
emergence of market power, but they will also limit the flexibility of water users. Moreover, they
are difficult to implement and could become a stifling influence on development. Other
measures can be used to deal with the issue of market power, such as regulatory controls over
transfers which seek to prevent the wholesale acquisition of available supplies without a
demonstration of present or reasonably foreseeable need and the imposition of taxes for
holding a water right without developing it within a reasonable time (Simpson, 1994b). The
problem with the latter solution is establishing the form and level of the tax and not unfairly
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penalizing those who have justifiable reasons for holding rights, while the former suffers from
the same deficiencies as the beneficial use doctrine.
Another option is direct state participation in the water market, for example, as an
intermediary, as with the California Draught Water Banks. Government probably has a
legitimate role in helping mediate in situations where many small water users confront a
dominant buyer or seller (Hamilton, Whittlesey and Halverson, 1989). Government operated
water banks can help discourage attempts by large water rights holders to take advantage of
water scarcity by speculating in water sales (Western Governors' Association, 1996).
If the emergence of market power is avoided in the initial allocation, there is little
danger of the undue concentration of water rights in the hands of few colluding users. One
reason, is the reluctance of water rights holders to engage in permanent transfers. In
California, for example, the emphasis is on annual spot markets and emerging option markets
(Howitt, 1997). In Chile, sales are still relatively infrequent in most areas.
(b) Market power in the output market
The second aspect of the market power problem - the potential for some economic
agents to use water rights to exercise market power in the output market -  is also a concern,
but "there are reasons to doubt whether such strategies can be supported as equilibrium
outcomes of market competition", instead incumbents would probably prefer to accommodate
entry (Gilbert, 1989). There are few, if any industries, where water is a significant input,
although there is little or no possibility for substitution in some important uses. Available water
supply sources may differ in their characteristics, but all of them can substitute for one another
to some extent. As a result, most potential users have a wide range of alternative supplies of
water and alternative technologies. Users can substitute labour, management, or capital for
water in many uses. In addition, many goods and services produced in the water sector are
tradable, either nationally or internationally, and have a wide range of substitutes. When
substitutes are available, competition arising from the threat of losing customers to substitute
products and services, can discipline the conduct of rights holders. The main exception could
be hydroelectricity generation, which suggests the need to develop an adequate regulatory
framework and to avoid uncompensated and unconditional allocation of water rights. If any
user were to follow a strategy designed to raise costs for potential competitors, it would be a
question of fact as to whether they were engaging in illegal monopolistic practices and this is
precisely the circumstance antitrust laws are designed to deal with.
For example in Chile, the Empresa Nacional de Electricidad S.A. (ENDESA) is the
largest electricity generating company and also the largest owner of non-consumptive water
rights holding more than half of issued rights (see Table 7). This has given rise to allegations
that it "can obtain the monopoly equilibrium over time by postponing investment. New
entrepreneurs will be unable to enter because they do not have the water rights to undertake
the more efficient projects" (Bitran and Sáez, 1994). The Comisión Nacional de Energía, the
entity in charge of regulation in the electric sector, has estimated that a delay in the
implementation of a large hydroelectric project could increase tariffs by up to 20% (Peña,
1997). Prompted by these concerns, the anti-trust commission has recently recommended to
the DGA not to grant to ENDESA a series of new non-consumptive water rights it had
previously requested (El Diario, 1997).
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Table 7
Non-consumptive water rights in Chile
In use Granted but not
used
Total
m³/sec (%) m³/sec (%) m³/sec (%)
Large electric utilities
- ENDESA 1 013 59.6 6 583 58.8 7 596 25.3
- CHILGENER 121 7.1 1 579 14.1 1 700 5.7
- COLBUN 190 11.2 - - 190 0.6
Others 375 22.1 3 041 27.1 3 416 11.4
Total 1 699 100.0 11 203 100.0 12 902 43.0
Estimated potentially usable flow - - - - 30 000 100.0
Source: Chile/MOP/DGA (undated).
2. Other market imperfections
(a) "Thin" markets
Optimally, markets involve a relatively large set of transactions taking place
continuously over time. A large number of buyers and sellers is an important condition for a
stable and smoothly functioning water market. Thin markets, markets in which trades are few
and far between, are common in water rights. In contrast to large, active markets where buyers
or sellers take the prevailing price as given, in thin markets, prices must be negotiated case by
case (Saleth, Braden and Eheart, 1991). Thus, thin markets are characterized by bargaining
rather than competitive conditions. "In a bargaining environment, allocational efficiency
depends critically on the relative bargaining strengths of the participants as determined by the
bargaining environment" (Saleth and Braden, 1995).
In a thin market, search, information and negotiation costs may be very large (Crouter,
1987; Colby, Crandall and Bush, 1993). In addition, a thin market, where each transaction is
unique and negotiated on a case-by-case basis, is likely to be less effective in setting a price
that accurately signals the value of water and transmitting this and other information to market
participants. "Specifically, when there are few potential traders, or traders are highly disparate
in size, the linkages and information flows within a market may be inadequately developed and
a common unit price will not emerge" (Clearwater Consulting Corporation, 1997). In a market
with few transactions, demand and supply conditions can change quickly resulting in price
volatility which increases price risk, reduces incentives to engage in trading and encourages
hoarding (Tietenberg, 1995). A small number of participants makes any market more
susceptible to manipulation by participants making it easier to establish and exercise market
power leading to inefficiency and limiting the efficiency gains from water exchanges. Carefully
designed bargaining rules can facilitate the efficient operation of a thin water market and
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reduce the efficiency losses due to strategic bargaining behaviour (Saleth, Braden and Eheart,
1991; Saleth and Braden, 1995).
(b) Speculation
One of the most common concerns about unregulated water markets is the danger of
speculation in water rights. Speculators are, however, an essential ingredient in any market.
Their participation can help deepen and widen the market, thereby facilitating a key market
function - the establishment of a "going" price. Small-scale speculation, carried out by a large
number of water rights holders in "highly developed systems is useful and probably cannot by
prevented", because it facilitates communication of water availabilities and prices, and
improves market performance (Howe, 1997b). While speculators can play a useful role, it is as
inappropriate to leave important water resource management decisions solely to their
forecasting abilities, as it is to those of bureaucrats.
Under full transferability, mistaken decisions are costly for a speculator, while those
who decide correctly are rewarded. If speculators persist in holding water rights longer then
necessary, they incur substantial opportunity costs, since they must forego not only the benefits
that they could enjoy from the proceeds of the rejected opportunity to sell, but also the income
that they could earn by investing those funds. So speculators are constantly trading off the
present value of a future sale against the present value of a current sale (Williams, 1983). It is
also sometimes argued that speculation gives future users and consumers a voice, albeit an
indirect and limited one, in the market place (Anderson, 1985). To succeed, speculators must
have superior foresight in choosing their timing. Natural selection confines to a small portion of
the market all would-be speculators except these few (Williams, 1983).
On the whole, in a free market, the possibility that speculation might distort prices
through unequal bargaining power or monopoly control cannot be ruled out, particularly where
water rights are granted free of charge in basins with a large number of unappropriated water
rights and rapid demand growth. In developed market systems with fully appropriated water
rights by many water users, these fears are probably exaggerated. In Chile, for example,
according to Bauer (1997), the concern about speculation has been exaggerated in the case of
consumptive rights, where agriculture accounts for the bulk of transactions, although
speculation or hoarding "seems to have had a significant impact" in the holding of
non-consumptive rights.
(c) Hoarding
Hoarding occurs when water users instead of selling water rights, accumulate and
retain them for possible future use. It has a number of negative consequences. Hoarding
results in thinner markets and fewer trades than might otherwise have been possible, and
hence may act to reduce the overall economic benefits of water markets.
"Hoarding is a response to risk and it intensifies the very problem to which it is a
response" (Tietenberg, 1995). Faced with the risk that in the future water rights might not be
available for sale or lease or that their price might rapidly increase, water rights holders retain
their rights for possible future use (e.g., if they decide to expand operations or some future
unanticipated event, such as a drought, makes them vulnerable to water shortages). This
means that reducing the risk associated with the availability and price of future water rights
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mitigates against the occurrence of hoarding. "Greater security translates into a greater
willingness to sell" (Tietenberg, 1995).
Examples of public policies than can be used to reduce these risks, and hence
remove the motivations that give rise to hoarding behaviour, include: (i) the policies aimed at
broadening the market and providing a large number of participants on both the buyer and the
seller side of the market (demand and supply conditions tend to be more stable in markets with
a large number of buyers and sellers, while thin markets are often characterized by higher price
and availability risks); (ii) the development of storage facilities and interconnected conveyance
systems; and (iii) the development of active spot, forward and futures markets. Forward and
futures water markets permit water users to hedge against changes in the price and availability
of water rights, and thus eliminate the need to hoard as a hedge against this risk.
B. Alternative public policies to deal with the problems
of market power, speculation and hoarding
1. The appurtenancy rule
Attachment ("appurtenancy") of water rights to a specific parcel of land forms part of many
water rights systems, particularly, under the riparian system, where the right to use and enjoy
water emerges from a person's ownership of land touching a watercourse, but also in other
systems, such as those of the provinces of Mendoza and San Juan in Argentina. A common
justification for attaching water rights to land is to prevent speculation. The implications of the
appurtenancy rule for water allocation are relatively small when water is abundant and
trade-offs are unnecessary, but its limitations became increasingly evident when water
becomes scarce and non-adjacent lands develop needs for water. Where water is, however,
not as plentiful or where water quality problems are important, it "simply does not work" (Howe,
1996).
Although, in general, the appurtenancy rule does not encourage water reallocation, its
implications for water markets depend on its actual implementation (Saliba and Bush, 1987). In
those jurisdictions where the appurtenancy rule permanently attaches a right to use water to a
particular parcel of land and allows water to be transferred only if the buyer purchases the land
to which the rights are attached, it hinders the development of separate land and water
markets (Crouter, 1987). This is inefficient because it unnecessary links land, an immobile
stock resource, to water, a mobile, flow resource, thereby limiting the potential uses of both
resources. Water is a factor of production for various sectors and, for this reason alone, it
should be transferable separately from land. The appurtenancy rule hinders an efficient and
equitable allocation of water rights, severely limits opportunities for market transactions, makes
them more costly and complex, and increases the costs of meeting water needs in other areas.
In the jurisdictions which prohibit the sale of water exclusive of the land to which it is
tied, the practice has built up of transferring water through complicated land exchanges, which
are incidental to the real purpose of the transaction - acquisition of water rights. Land may be
acquired for the sole purpose of obtaining the accompanying water rights, known as "water
ranching", as in the United States. Such practices were also common in Australia where,
before permanent transfers of water rights through markets were liberalized in the eighties,
farmers transferred water entitlements through "duality of ownership" or "licence stacking"
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which involved purchasing two parcels of land and transferring the water entitlement from one
to the other (Anderson and Snyder, 1997).
Where the appurtenancy rule is interpreted as simply requiring that to change the point
of diversion or location of use, a transfer application must be approved by the appropriate
public agency, its effects on market transfers are generally innocuous. Such a requirement
generally imposes only minor transaction costs on market participants (Saliba and Bush,
1987).
In many parts of Latin America, the appurtenancy principle inherited from Spanish law
is still adhered to (ECOSOC, 1996). In some areas, such as in western Argentina, the
appurtenancy principle, restricts the transfer of water both intra- and inter-sectorally, and, in
association with other factors, "has made a noticeable contribution to the stagnation and even
regression of regional economies" (ECOSOC, 1996). In the province of Mendoza, for example,
water rights are tied to land and changes in the source of supply are not allowed, expect in very
special cases, resulting in a rigid system of water allocation which is incompatible with rational
and efficient use (Bertranou et al., 1987). A recent study of water resources management in
the province recommended to make surface water rights for irrigation tradable among water
users and to allow temporal and permanent water rights transfers (Howe, 1997a).
2. The beneficial use doctrine
In most jurisdictions, traditionally, the allocation and retention of non-riparian water rights are
contingent upon putting them to some beneficial use. A typical formulation of the rule of
beneficial use, as applied in the United States, is that beneficial use is the basis, measure and
limit of all rights to the use of water, consistent with the interest of the public in the best
utilization of water supplies. In 1981, Chile departed from the beneficial use exigency, and this
is proposed in the new water law under discussion in Peru and in similar proposals in some
other countries of the region.
The beneficial use doctrine emerged when unappropriated water existed along side
rapid economic growth. Without the obligation to apply water beneficially, the first user on a
stream could lay claim to all the water. This is obviously impossible on fully appropriated
streams. The idea behind the requirement was that the quantity of water used should be no
more than needed, the concern being with the possibility of vesting an absolute monopoly on a
single water user and preventing speculation. It is often summarized as the "use it or lose it"
principle. The tenets of the doctrine of effective and beneficial use are: water is not to be
obtained for speculation or let run to waste, the end use must be a generally recognized and
socially acceptable use; water is not to be misused, and the use must be reasonable compared
with other uses (ECOSOC, 1996).
Under forfeiture and abandonment provisions of the beneficial use doctrine, a right can
be lost and become available for appropriation by others after a period, typically three to five
years of continuous non-beneficial use, when water is over-applied and not used beneficially
for a certain time period, due to intent to abandon the right, or when the right has fallen into
complete disuse. If not used, the right ultimately reverts to the reallocation through the state.
This is the general approach adopted under laws of the United States, Argentina, Mexico and
Spain (Solanes, 1996). The water needs of the projects that take a longer time to complete can
be accommodated with the help of conditional water rights. In the state of Colorado, for
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example, in order to maintain a conditional water right, an applicant must demonstrate
reasonable diligence in developing the right, every six years from the date the right is awarded.
The beneficial use doctrine has important implications for water marketing in that it
defines those water uses that can participate in market transfers, i.e., those water uses for
which water rights can be granted by the State in the initial allocation of rights or acquired in a
market transaction. Water uses which have not been declared beneficial cannot hold water
rights and cannot participate in water marketing. The declaration that a potential use is
beneficial serves, therefore, as an "entry point" into the market process (Colby, 1988).
Obviously, this requirement reduces the number of potential market participants to those few
who can put water to immediate use, and hence competition in the market. Thus, its abolition is
likely to increase the number of potential current buyers, and thereby stimulate market activity.
The application of the beneficial use doctrine can provide water rights holders with an
incentive to transfer their water rights rather than hoard them and risk forfeiture under forfeiture
and abandonment laws. Its impact on incentives to transfer or use rather than hoard water
rights depends, however, on the monitoring, implementation and enforcement procedures. The
problem with this approach is that the doctrine discourages hoarding administratively but fails
to address the rational motivations that give rise to hoarding behaviour. The transferability of
water rights in the market can provide a more direct incentive to both avoid waste and to
reallocate water to its highest value use in response to changing conditions. In an open market,
water users failing to sell their water rights forego the proceeds from those sales and the
income that could be earned by investing these funds. Thus, "when rights are fully transferable,
there is no need for a horde of government agents to snoop about and uncover waste. There is
no need for laws to prohibit waste or for courts to define it" (Williams, 1985).
The fear is often expressed that without the penalty of forfeiture for non-use, the
incentives for large water rights holders to transfer water rights, would be relatively small
compared with the strategic advantages from the control of a key production input which could
be used to block entry (ECOSOC, 1996). In most settings, however, there is little danger of any
single user dominating a basin to a degree that market competition is impossible and even if
this were to occur, more flexible and market-compatible policy options are available to deal with
this problem. It is also claimed that the beneficial use doctrine is necessary to prevent the
so-called "sleeper" or unused rights, which introduce uncertainty into the system of water use
and reallocation (Livingston, 1993).
Whatever its historical justification, the beneficial use doctrine has important
drawbacks from the point of view of economic efficiency. In highly developed systems where
water is fully appropriated by many water users, it is probably unnecessary and its continuation
does not encourage efficient water development and utilization. It can be expected that the
application of the doctrine will gradually fade away (Scott and Coustalin, 1995). The doctrine
has already been relaxed in many jurisdictions - in the state of Colorado, it has been said that,
"the only use ever ruled nonbeneficial by a water court was a diversion used to drown praire
dog colonies on a ranch" (Howe, Schurmeier and Shaw, 1986b) - to make it more compatible
with the need to encourage conservation and promote flexibility in water allocation. This was
necessary because in some instances, sale of a water right had been interpreted as evidence
that its owner could no longer put the water to beneficial use (Frederick and Kneese, 1988).
The beneficial use doctrine is sometimes criticized because it is difficult to define what
constitutes "beneficial" use "with any degree of precision, as any level of beneficial use is
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permissible" (Anderson, 1961). Whatever be the case, the definition of what constitutes
"beneficial" use must be adaptable to changing economic needs and social values (Howe,
1997b). It should be broad enough to include all uses, both offstream and instream, that
generate social benefits. It should also be formulated in such a way so as not to introduce
uncertainty in the water allocation process and should not contain preferences or priories of
use, except those to be applied in time of severe water shortages with a provision for adequate
compensation.
The beneficial use doctrine can, also, be criticized on the grounds that it encourages
wasteful expenditure of resources (Williams, 1985). Since under the beneficial use doctrine,
those water users who anticipate future profitable water-related projects cannot hold rights for
future sale or use, there is an incentive to invest prematurely in facilities for an immediate use
recognized as beneficial. These investments may be economically attractive only because they
secure water rights for the future or transfer them from the public to the private domain. As a
result, these is an incentive for water rights holders to disguise their future needs with
investments that are economically unjustifiable or premature. Similarly, the beneficial use
doctrine can reduce incentives to engage in "speculation" and "hoarding", but does not prevent
speculation, rather it forces the would-be speculators to disguise their activity by wasting
resources in the construction of diversion works that are either economically unjustifiable
regardless of their timing or are premature. Inefficiencies can also arise when water rights
holders use more water than they can presently use profitably in order to protect the security of
their rights, to assure additional supplies for the future, or establish a right to the use of such
water in the future when the use might become profitable (Burness and Quirk, 1979). The
result is the excessive use of water and the realization of investments sooner than is
necessary. A related problem is the disincentive provided for water conservation and for the
transfer of salvaged water.
To protect against the disincentive the doctrine provides to efficient water use, state
water laws in the United States usually limit water rights to diversions that qualify as "beneficial
consumptive use" or to the amount of water "reasonably" required for the use to be served, and
prohibit waste, misuse or unreasonable use of water. The beneficial use, anti-waste provisions,
however, were "never enforced to the stringency necessary to promote efficiency" (Anderson,
Maddox and Simmons, 1991).
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Where there are active water markets, the beneficial use doctrine is probably
unnecessary, but it can probably be justified as a transitory measure in some settings,
particularly in basins with a large number of unappropriated water rights and rapid demand
growth. In jurisdictions where water rights are granted free of charge, the requirement of
beneficial use could be necessary in so far as it can help prevent frivolous claims on all
unappropriated water, and speculation sustained on the hoarding and accumulation of
non-used water rights.
3. Taxes
One possible way to address the problems of market power, speculation and hoarding within
the framework of voluntary water transfers is to introduce a tax on water rights holdings. Water
rights would be appraised and taxed separately from land and other resources. The tax rate
should not depend on the purpose for which the water is used, but only on the type of water
right. This means that the introduction of a tax on water rights should generally be
accompanied by a corresponding adjustment of land taxes and other similar taxes on irrigated
land.
Such a tax has many desirable consequences. By raising the cost of water, taxing
water rights separately from land discourages both the acquisition of water rights without
intention to put them to a beneficial use and their hoarding, and provides a strong incentive for
water rights holders to transfer unused rights in order to reduce their tax burden. It also fosters
market discipline and efficiency, accelerates water reallocation, both intra- and inter-sectoral, to
higher-value uses, promotes conservation, provides incentives for more efficient water use and
allocation, and, in sum, encourages water rights holders to manage water as an economic
good, rather than as a free attribute of land ownership. Other important advantages of the tax
approach is that for governments, the ability to collect an annual tax would make it possible to
generate considerable revenue that could be used to finance the surveillance, record-keeping,
enforcement and other regulatory efforts necessary to run the system. It could also be used to
compensate negative externalities associated with water transfers or to finance river basin
management activities with strong positive externalities or public goods characteristics. A tax
on water rights would also give the government the incentive to register and regularize all water
rights.
The main problems with taxes are that: (i) the determination of the optimal rate is
fraught with non-trivial difficulties, while tax rates must be estimated accurately from the very
beginning because they are not always easy to change; (ii) if the rate is too low, the tax would
not achieve its purpose, and if it is too high, the tax would unduly penalize water users and can
discourage investments; (iii) taxes on inputs tend to be more difficult to define and easier to
evade than taxes on outputs; and (iv) taxes are unpopular and are likely to resisted (Pearce,
1989). The institutional costs of implementing a system of taxes are likely to be high,
particularly where there many water rights holders. This kind of considerations have prevented
the introduction of specific taxes on water rights in Chile. The result is, however, that only
farmers pay, at least implicitly, taxes on the water right, as irrigated land has a higher value
and, therefore, higher land taxes. One of the proposed reforms to the 1991 Water Code calls
for the introduction of a license or fee ("patente") for non-use (Peña, 1997). The approach is
modelled after a similar concept in Chilean mining law: a concessionaire must either make
actual use of the right to develop the mining concession, or pay an annual fee to maintain it.
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